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In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, American 
troops contended with insurgent forces resistant to conventional tactics. General David 
Petraeus, along with other military experts, addressed the need for new strategies with the 
publication of Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (3-33.5) in 2006. The manual laid out 
methods by which American troops should quell insurgent threats in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This thesis is concerned with how the Marine Corps enacted the policies of 
3-33.5 in Helmand Province between 2010 and 2012.  
 The tenants of this new manual were tested in the years following President Barak 
Obama’s commitment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009. Helmand 
Province was under the combat control of the Marines from 2010 to 2014, and during the 
first two years, operations near the town of Marjah and the district of Sangin closely 
followed principles laid out in 3-33.5. Although the withdrawal of American units in 
2014 did not bode well for the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Helmand, the period in 
question proved the ability of the Marine Corps to effectively carry out doctrinal 
principles. Through an examination of command chronologies and oral history 
interviews, this thesis shows the process in which official counterinsurgency policy was 
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2010, Nicholas Anderson, a twenty-one-year-old private from Grand 
Haven, Michigan, arrived in Sangin district with the 3rd Battalion 5th Marine Regiment. In 
the first two days of the battalion’s deployment, eight Marines were killed by roadside 
bombs. Anderson’s own platoon moved slowly, using metal detectors to move 
throughout the district, often at a speed of only 50 feet per day. Though tasked with 
building rapport with civilians, the heavy Taliban presence in the area prevented Marine 
interaction with locals. However, by the spring of 2011, the persistent patrols began to 
have a marked effect on the district. Civilians became increasingly willing to interact 
with the 3/5, Anderson thought, because the Marines’ actions disproved Taliban-spread 
rumors about their cruelty.1 In a war largely shrouded in overarching failure, the bloody, 
but steady progress made by the 3/5 is indicative of the local headway within America’s 
counterinsurgent approach in Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban’s resolve and operational 
deficiencies within the Afghan National Army, the Marines’ ability to execute both 
kinetic and humanitarian elements of counterinsurgency give credence the ability of 
American units to put doctrine into practice.  
A study of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan cannot be done without addressing 
the ongoing debate surrounding its efficacy. One of the most widely known COIN 
scholars is John A. Nagl, a former army officer with first-hand knowledge of the 
implementation of COIN in Iraq. His familiarity with irregular warfare was a contributing 
factor in the publication of 3-33.5.  His most notable work, Learning to Eat Soup with a 
 




Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, examines 
counterinsurgency operations carried out by American and British troops. Nagl highlights 
the British experience in Malaya during the 1940s and 1950s in order to show what he 
considers the proper process of adaptation against a non-conventional enemy. He 
contends that the willingness to implement new strategies allowed the British to 
effectively reduce insurgent activity. Malaya also serves as a point of contrast to the 
American experience in Vietnam. The unwillingness of the American military to make 
necessary changes led to its failure to defeat the communists.2 Nagl’s work highlights the 
importance of adaptation in warfare. For the Marines following the principles of COIN as 
established in 3-33.5, their ability to adapt was far more crucial than their ability to 
neutralize conventional threats.  
 Writing in opposition to Nagl is Gian Gentile. During his time as commander of a 
cavalry squadron in Iraq, Gentile was no stranger to the complications of non-
conventional warfare. He first read 3-33.5 while in Bagdad. He felt that the manual, and 
most other attempts at formulating counterinsurgency policy, failed to account for the 
complex nature of Iraqi society. His book Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of 
Counterinsurgency, elaborates on this issue in conflicts from Vietnam to Afghanistan. He 
contends that America’s adoption of COIN was a mistake and is likely to be met with 
continued failure.3 Other works such as David Fitzgerald’s Learning to Forget: US Army 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq, present a similar stance 
 
2 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
3 Colonel Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: Americas Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New 
York: The New Press, 2013). 
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to Gentile. Fitzgerald argues that American military policymakers have, over the last 70 
years, attempted to write effective COIN policy by applying the lessons of failed attempts 
in the past. As the title Learning to Forget suggests, this effort has been met with 
continued failure.4  
 In addition to the secondary examinations of twentieth century COIN operations, 
academics are beginning to look at contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Unfortunately, the lack of availability of declassified documents prevents the field from 
becoming as comprehensive as that of mid twentieth century conflicts. However, several 
scholars have found success in studying Afghan civilians. In 2016, Metin Gurcan 
published What Went Wrong in Afghanistan? Understanding Counter-Insurgency Efforts 
in Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments. Gurcan explains that a primary failure 
within America’s counterinsurgency efforts was the failure to understand Tribalized 
Rural Muslim Environments (TRMEs).5 His study is certainly relevant, as this thesis will 
show that interacting with Afghan tribal leaders was crucial to establishing rapport 
between Marines and Afghan civilians. The means of pacifying one village may be vastly 
different than what is required to pacify another, even one within the same district or 
province. Gurcan’s perspective is complimented by works such as Mike Martin’s an 
Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012. Martin interviewed 
Helmand natives to highlight the complex nature of Afghan society and to ensure the 
 
4 David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from 
Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 
5 Metin Gurcan, What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?: Understanding Counter-Insurgency Efforts in 
Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2016). 
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inclusion of their perspective in Afghan histories.6 Interviews with Helmandis are rare, 
making Martin’s work crucial to understanding the Afghan response to Marine COIN 
efforts in the province.   
 Other secondary works examine the war in Afghanistan from multiple angles. 
Marine Lieutenant Aaron O’Connell brings together a collection of military and policy 
experts for Our Latest and Longest War: Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan. The 
overarching theme of this collection is the failure on part of the United States to achieve 
strategic victory in Afghanistan. The essays examine special operations and diplomatic 
efforts, along with counterinsurgency to show the flaws of the wider military effort in 
Afghanistan.7 Another key collection is Beth Bailey and Richard Immerman’s 
Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,8 which addresses military strategy 
in each theater, along with an assessment of popular culture and the legacies of each 
conflict. The articles, while not directly assessing operations in Helmand province, 
provide a foundation for understanding military and home front activity during America’s 
War on Terror.  
 While this study is primarily concerned with contributing to the existing 
scholarship of America’s war in Afghanistan, comparisons can be gleaned through an 
examination of past conflicts. The Soviet conflict with the mujahideen in the 1980s is 
certainly applicable to a study of American combat experiences in the early twenty-first 
 
6 Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
7 Aaron B. O’Connell, Our Latest Longest War: Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017). 
8 Beth Bailey and Richard H. Immerman, ed, Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (New York: NYU Press, 2015). 
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century. Though the dynamic of the Afghan guerilla force changed in the years leading 
up to American involvement, there are striking similarities between the two conflicts. 
Rodric Braithwaite’s Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89, is one of few 
comprehensive studies of the war. A former British ambassador in Russia, Braithwaite 
contends that the Soviet leadership reluctantly invaded Afghanistan after their attempts to 
curb the impulses of the fledgling socialist government had failed.9 The frustrations 
towards the Afghan government are useful when analyzing the complications of 
American troops when given the task of strengthening the operational abilities of the 
Afghan National Army. Additionally, Braithwaite’s work is largely based on the 
experience of the Soviet soldier. Focusing on the combatant lends itself to an in-depth 
investigation of the strategies employed by both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.  
 In addition to scholarship on the Soviet War, Andrew Bacevich’s 2016 work, 
America’s War for the Greater Middle East, provides useful context for a study on 
Helmand.10 Bacevich discusses the United States’ involvement in the Middle East from 
the administration of President Jimmy Carter to Barak Obama. Through a discussion of 
nearly four decades of military operations, Bacevich highlights major shortcomings of 
American strategic thinking and military policy. He critiques American involvement, 
contending that American military action often showed both an unwillingness to commit 
or withdraw.11 Of note is his chapter titled “Government in a Box” in which he discusses 
Obama’s commitment of additional troops to Afghanistan. Operation Moshtarak, one of 
 
9 Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
10  Andrew Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, (New York: Random House, 
2016).  
11 Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, 367.  
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the two case studies of this thesis, is also discussed within the larger context of the troop 
surge and subsequent drawdown. Bacevich concludes that the period between the troop 
surge drawdown in 2014 left the future of Afghanistan uncertain, for victory remained 
unachieved and ten thousand troops continued to operate in the country.12 
 It is important to clarify that the debate between COIN critics and proponents is a 
crucial component to any study of insurgent warfare. However, those who argue against 
its efficacy often use failure as their primary support. From the French war in Algeria, to 
American involvement in Vietnam, COIN has largely failed to achieve the results sought 
by the occupation force. COIN scholars (of which many are critics) justifiably use this 
fact to support their positions. However, few have attempted to look beyond the 
overarching narrative of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shifting focus away from larger 
failures allows for a focused examination of all facets of strategy. A focus on Marine 
units in Helmand allows the particulars of COIN doctrine to shine through and proves the 
ability of American armed forces to put those principles into action. 
Conducting research into the Helmand conflict has inherent challenges. As of 
2019, Americans continue to operate against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Because of this, 
much of the documentary evidence on the war remains classified. However, unit 
command chronologies serve as a valuable source of information, as they account for 
activities of both deployed units and those training in the United States. This thesis 
utilizes the command chronologies of Marines deployed in the vicinity of Marjah and 
Sangin. A significant number of command chronologies are available at the Marine 
 
12 Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East, 318-319. 
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Corps History Division’s Archives in Quantico, Virginia, where historians work to 
provide digitized documents to researchers.  
While accessible to public researchers, the availability of command chronologies 
varies from unit to unit. Preliminary research for this thesis began with requests for all 
Marine unit chronologies for Afghanistan from 2010 to 2012. Inconsistencies in record 
keeping, as well as classification, creates gaps in the historical record of many units. The 
Marine Corps History Division Archives at Quantico contain many relevant Helmand 
chronologies, but some unit records reveal little to no information on Helmand 
operations. Fortunately, chronologies that account for wartime experience contain an 
abundance of valuable insight into counterinsurgency. Additionally, battalion-level 
chronologies often break down activities by company, permitting a nuanced look into 
multiple facets of strategy such as civilian interaction.   
If pertinent to the unit’s mission, battalion-level records address operations 
conducted with Afghan units. Given the importance of training Afghans to fight the 
Taliban without Marine assistance, these chronologies are crucial to this study. Units with 
detailed records of coordinated operations give useful insight into these relationships 
formed and evolved over time. Meetings with village elders are recorded along with 
significant setbacks and casualty figures. Though oral history interviews often reveal 
more details on the specific discussions, command chronologies show the consistency of 
the meetings and general assessments of developing relationships.  
In addition to Marine Corps command chronologies, oral histories conducted by 
field historians are essential to understanding counterinsurgency in Helmand. The oral 
history branch of the Marine Corps History Division is home to thousands of Marine 
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interviews. Those selected for this project were largely conducted by field historians, who 
unlike civilian interviewers, speak with military personnel throughout their deployments. 
Marine field historians also speak with civilian contractors working in the sphere of local 
government. Their perspectives illuminate the complexities of merging the traditional 
military function of combat with governmental roles of nation building. Examining 
Marine experiences as they occurred allows for heightened clarity of details concerning 
operations launched in Marjah and Sangin.  
The Library of Congress’ Veterans History Project (VHP) is another valuable 
source of interviews. Though interviews in the VHP archive take place years after an 
individual’s service, time often allows veterans to contextualize their experience within 
the conflict as a whole. Two of the Marine interviews referenced in this thesis come from 
Grand Valley State University’s VHP archive. Headed by Dr. James Smither, a military 
historian with extensive experience in oral history, GVSU’s collection contains 
interviews with veterans from the Second World War to the War on Terror. Small 
collections like the one housed at Grand Valley are crucial to understanding soldiers’ 
experiences, as field historians cannot interview each Marine. 
This thesis examines two counterinsurgency operations in Helmand province. 
Chapter two is a discussion of Operation Moshtarak in the town of Marjah. In early 2010, 
troops began to arrive as part of President Obama’s promise to increase the United States’ 
commitment to the war before withdrawal in 2014. A major stronghold for Taliban 
fighters in northern Helmand, Marjah’s threat to coalition forces mirrored that of 
Fallujah, Iraq which fell to American forces in late 2004. Within this chapter, the COIN 
principle of clearing areas from insurgent control serves as a focal point. The ambitions 
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behind Moshtarak did not completely account for the willingness of the Taliban to endure 
the American presence. From February until December 2010, coalition forces fought 
insurgents for control of the town. This chapter accounts for the operation itself, along 
with subsequent fighting in 2011. As time in Marjah passed, Marines continued to fight 
the Taliban in sporadic engagements while working to build up local security forces and 
Afghan army units.  
Throughout the chapter, interviews with Marines and civilian contractors provide 
details into how International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel worked to 
push the Taliban out of the town and maintain security. The final portion of the chapter 
assesses the ability of Marine units to conduct counterinsurgency operations in an urban 
setting. Though sporadic firefights broke out between 2010 and 2011, the Marine 
presence allowed for humanitarian elements of COIN to take effect. These included 
regular meetings with local leaders, distribution of medical and food supplies, and 
construction of public facilities. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how 
urban COIN differed from that in rural environments, leading into the next case study.   
Chapter three critiques Marine combat operations in the district of Sangin in 
northeastern Helmand. In the summer of 2010, the 3rd Battalion 7th Marine Regiment 
arrived in the district; their mission, in line with the key tenants of COIN, was to clear the 
district of Taliban fighters, maintain security throughout, and begin building 
infrastructure there. In a district littered with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and 
ambush points, the 3/7 and subsequent units slowly reduced the insurgent presence. The 
deployment of 3/5, beginning in the fall of 2010, saw significant casualties, however, as 
new units took over, attacks came less frequently. Such developments illustrate the 
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importance of risk-taking in counterinsurgency. Forward operating bases (FOBs) 
provided the only security in the district yet remaining within the confines of walls led to 
little progress. In the early days of the Marines’ battle for Sangin, members of the 3/5 put 
themselves at risk to ensure the security of civilians and spark relations with them. As the 
Taliban’s grip on the district loosened, civilians left their homes more frequently to 
interact with Marines on patrol.  
Following the deployment of 3/5, incoming Marine units maintained the 
operational cadence set in 2010. One year after the 3/5’s brutal introduction to Sangin, 
the 3rd Battalion 7th Marine regiment (which had deployed to Sangin in the summer of 
2010) reassumed operational control of the district. Much like preceding units, the 3/7 
maintained constant contact with Sangin’s civilian population, which now frequently 
interacted with Marines. Marine testimonials and the personal accounts of Lieutenant 
Colonel Seth Folsom, the battalion’s commander, highlight civilian-Marine interactions. 
In addition to civilian relations, Marines in Sangin trained Afghan security forces. Oral 
histories illuminate the complex nature of military cooperation in Afghanistan. 
Discussion of marijuana use, poppy cultivation and eradication, and Taliban infiltration 
of the Afghan army gives additional proof of the Marines’ ability to perform their duties 
despite significant pushback from their allies. The deployment of 1st Battalion 7th Marine 
regiment in 2012 saw many of these issues, yet the unit remained unwavering in its 
purpose. By the end of 2012, the prospect of a future without the Taliban seemed 
unlikely. Despite the outcome that awaited Sangin upon the Marines’ exit, Sangin serves 
as another example of strict adherence to official COIN policy.  
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The conclusion of this thesis is a cross-examination of the two case studies. The 
stories of Marjah and Sangin district do not necessarily prove the efficacy of 
counterinsurgency as an overarching strategy; however, evidence suggests that Marine 
units in Helmand abided by the COIN tenants of 3-33.5. Marines in Helmand proved that 
interacting with Afghanistan’s populace was possible regardless of the omnipresent 
Taliban. Marjah and Sangin are but two examples of a much larger military effort, but 
humanitarian efforts and the interaction between Marines and Afghan civilians testify to 


















CHAPTER II- PROLOGUE 
 Prior to the War on Terror, the American military’s experience with 
counterinsurgency had been problematic. It most notable brush with this type of 
unconventional war came in the 1960s and 1970s, when the U.S. attempted to stem the 
tide of communism in Vietnam. For nearly a decade, guerilla forces of the Viet Cong 
battled American troops for Vietnam’s political future. During the conflict, the US 
military placed significant importance on attrition; killing insurgents was a top priority. 
In the early days of America’s involvement, programs such as the CIA’s Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) illustrated America’s capability in testing new forms of 
irregular warfare. The program paired Vietnamese villages with American special force 
operators, who trained the villages in the defense of their homes. However, as the war 
unfolded in the mid-1960s, such programs were doxed in favor of large, offensive 
operations focused on enemy casualties. A popular view of the advisory years is that the 
US Army refused to move away from its conventional mindset, being far too rigid as an 
organization. Furthermore, American advisors failed to gain a proper understanding of 
the Vietnamese people. Such a failure meant that the ARVN created to stem the 
communist tide, served a conventional purpose, one ill suited to meet the challenges of an 
insurgency.13 
 As the war progressed, attempts were made to bring attention to the lack of 
American counterinsurgency knowledge. The Program for the Pacification and Long-
Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) launched a study in 1965 to highlight 
 
13 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002) 128-142. 
 
13 
deficiencies in American strategy. Their findings showed that the American military 
needed to place more importance on winning the favor of Vietnamese civilians. However, 
even with the replacement of General William Westmoreland with more 
counterinsurgency-minded Creighton Abrams, the US and its Vietnamese allies 
ultimately failed to shore up the south against northern advances. Counterinsurgency 
efforts that were attempted in Vietnam included pacification mission, which were 
attempts to win the sentiments of Vietnamese civilians. Unfortunately, many of these 
efforts became entangled with the objective of attrition, leading to many displaced 
civilians. Most of these people were forced to move into areas of government control, 
creating the illusion of successful pacification. Pacification campaigns in 1971 led to 
reduced insurgent activity in towns in the Mekong Delta; a result that was considered an 
example of successful pacification. However, it is likely that the violent displacement of 
civilians made it difficult for insurgents to garner support in the abandoned areas. Smaller 
efforts were made by Marines who worked at the village level to provide security and 
train local forces.14 Local efforts showed some modicum of success, but did not resonate 
at a higher level. The failure of counterinsurgent thinking to take root in the American 
military psyche created a dearth of knowledge that military thinkers sought to remedy in 
the twenty-first century, as the American military prepared to combat the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.   
The Taliban has been a significant part of Afghanistan’s DNA since its 
conception in the 1990s. Prior to the group’s rise to prominence, Afghans endured nearly 
 
14 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: The 
New Press, 2013), 73-77. See also Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 158-160. 
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a decade of conflict with the Soviet Union. To support a fledgling socialist government 
from native resistance, the Soviet military invaded in December 1979. In a war that 
shared similarities with America’s future conflict there, the Soviet military claimed little 
success in Afghanistan. Mujahideen rebels resistant to the communist-supported 
government in Kabul, conducted a guerilla war against the Soviet military. Unwilling to 
yield to the government in Kabul, the mujahideen proved more than capable of outlasting 
their eastern European counterparts. For nearly a decade, the Soviet military fought the 
mujahideen in the mountains of Afghanistan. Though technologically superior, the 
Soviets could not effectively contend with the terrain and ambush tactics of their 
adversary. Soviet forces suffered more than 15,000 combat fatalities against their enemy, 
that frequently resorted to mountain ambushes rather than meeting the Soviets in 
conventional engagements. Afghan fatalities are estimated between 600,000 and 1.5 
million.15 Throughout the conflict, the Soviet military failed to defeat an elusive enemy, 
one armed with weapons and equipment largely paid for by the United States 
government.  
Both before and during the conflict, the Soviets expended large amounts of capital 
on aid projects that included, schools, irrigation, and other forms of infrastructure 
improvements. Additionally, advisers were sent to Afghanistan to help with 
improvements and adjustments to the new governing system. In total, the Soviets spent 
4.7 billion roubles on nation building in Afghanistan. As the conflict progressed, Soviet 
advisors worked to keep production in factories going. Many of the advisors were non-
 




military actors who placed themselves at considerable risk of mujahideen attack, as they 
often worked outside the confines of major cities. However, despite these efforts, the 
Soviet advisors did not place much importance on the perspective of the Afghan civilian. 
In many instances, advisors made the final decisions on projects. 16 The failure to fully 
understand Afghans, coupled with the Red Army’s emphasis on killing the mujahideen, 
made its war in Afghanistan a decade-long slog.  
 The United States viewed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an act of Cold 
War aggression. Unwilling to ignore the situation, American policymakers launched 
Operation Cyclone, during which the mujahideen received weapons, ammunition, and 
other supplies. In 1986, the American government began to send Stinger missiles in 
addition to the aid it was already providing. Mujahideen armed with these antiaircraft 
weapons, now possessed the ability to counter soviet aircraft.17 Weapons and supplies 
sent to the mujahideen came into Afghanistan through neighboring Pakistan. 
Additionally, Pakistan served as a haven for the Afghan rebels wishing to train and rearm 
themselves. Soviet leadership, unwilling to create further conflict in the Middle East, 
largely refrained from pursuing mujahideen fighters outside of Afghanistan. Two decades 
later, American forces in Afghanistan battled an enemy of similar caliber, who also 
utilized the Pakistan border to their advantage.18 The Soviet conflict in Afghanistan 
 
16 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 147-148. 
17 Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, 1983-1990 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 239. 
18 Soviet-centric scholarship on the Soviet-Afghan War, unlike many American diplomatic works 
such as Oberdorfer’s The Turn, speak little about the implementation of the Stinger. Greg Feifer’s, The 
Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), and Braithwaite’s 
Afgantsy contend that the Stinger failed to dramatically alter the course of the war. Although evidence 
suggests the changing of Soviet flight patterns (more night missions), the effects of the American 
antiaircraft missiles was seemingly negligible.  
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proved that foreign intervention, regardless of firepower, came at a high price. Strong-
arming Afghans into cooperating with a larger government was not achievable at 
gunpoint.  
 Ultimately unsuccessful in its war aims and unwilling to expend further resources 
in Afghanistan, the Soviets withdrew in 1989. After a few years of in-fighting, 
mujahideen groups that once comprised the resistance against the Soviets, moved against 
the Afghan government and began taking cities. Urhanuddin Rabbani was placed in 
power. The Pashtun population of Afghanistan, which had long held the presidential 
position in the country, was embittered by the fact that Rabbani was Tajik. Fighting 
between Rabbani’s government and Pashtun opposition (backed by Pakistan) soon broke 
out.19 Divisions in Afghanistan led to intense fighting in the early 1990s. Pashtun groups 
angered by the appointment of Rabbani as president launched aggressive action against 
the government. This state of civil war also led to the rise of another group, determined to 
undo much of the socialist reforms enacted during the Soviet years.  
One of the causes of unrest during the Soviet years, was the push toward socialist 
reform by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Political moves, which 
included giving more freedoms to women, were staunchly opposed by traditional 
Afghans, many of whom lived in rural areas. Fighting between those who opposed 
reform and the government, was one of the contributing factors to the Soviet decision to 
invade in late 1979. In the early 1990’s similar sentiments manifested in a new group 
known as the Taliban. Comprised largely of followers of Deobandi Islam, the Taliban 
 
19 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2009), 46-48. 
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recruited likeminded individuals from Deobandi madrasas (religious schools), primarily 
located in Pakistan. A large portion of the Taliban’s eventual strength received education 
and training in Pakistan and fought with the mujahideen during the Soviet war. Their 
fight to push foreigners out of Afghanistan during the 1980s eventually translated to the 
restoration of religious traditions. One factor attributed to their zeal is the fact that the 
long duration of the Soviet war created a generation of Afghan refugees that had never 
seen their home country.20 The idea of reclaiming their true homes only deepened the 
resolve to create an Afghanistan in their own image. This vision included the limiting of 
women’s freedom, strict laws of appearance, the restriction of music and other forms of 
art, and severe punishment for adulterers and murderers. To fund its crusade for control 
of Afghanistan, the Taliban relied on the exportation of poppy. By the time the Taliban 
gained power, Afghanistan was responsible for 70 percent of the world’s illegal poppy.21 
Poppy cultivation, especially prominent in Afghanistan’s southern provinces, became a 
significant factor for American forces in post-surge counterinsurgency operations.  
The civil war that emerged amongst the factions of the mujahideen was a warning 
to the Taliban. To prevent these rivalries from seeping into its own ranks, the Taliban did 
not recruit veterans of the Soviet war, rather men who were too young to have 
participated in the conflict. This force of young men was led by a cleric named Mullah 
Omar. In 1994, the Taliban set its sights on the southern city of Kandahar, capturing it in 
late November.22 Rabbani’s appointment as president of Afghanistan provided Omar with 
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significant opportunity in the south. Primarily Pashtun, Afghanistan’s southern provinces, 
such as Helmand and Kandahar, provided support for the Taliban. Pashtun disdain for 
Rabbani made them ideal for maintaining Taliban holdings as it continued to capture 
provinces throughout the decade. Tribes and militias in the south were attracted to the 
Taliban’s religious objectives. Taliban members visited villages and communicated their 
goals; those who disagreed were dealt with severely. Though the Taliban’s rise to 
prominence did not happen overnight, the group successfully captured Kabul in 1996 and 
the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998.23 
During the late 1990s, the Taliban largely controlled Afghanistan; however, they 
continued to fight mujahideen groups from the north known collectively as the Northern 
Alliance. In 1999, the Taliban agreed to play host to Al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden 
and Ayman Al Zawahiri. In exchange for sanctuary in the mountains bordering Pakistan, 
Al Qaeda agreed to support the Taliban’s ongoing fight against the Northern Alliance. 
From its new home, Al Qaeda orchestrated attacks against American interests both at 
home and abroad. These attacks included the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and culminated in the mainland attacks of September 11, 
2001. In the three years leading up to 9/11, Mullah Omar expressed a staunch 
determination to harbor the Al Qaeda, further deepening the connection between the 
terror organization and the Taliban.24 Though American intelligence had been 
investigating Al Qaeda in the years leading up to 9/11, the attacks pushed American 
policymakers into more aggressive action. Soon after the dust settled in New York and 
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Washington D.C., American special forces and intelligence operators were on the ground, 
hunting Al Qaeda and working with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban.25  
In the closing months of 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring 
Freedom, to locate and destroy Al Qaeda, and to remove the Taliban from power. In mid-
October, three hundred special forces operators under the command of Colonel John 
Mulholland, formed Task Force Dagger, and began operations with the Afghan fighters. 
The alliance quickly proved fruitful; on November 9, the city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell, 
followed by Kandahar on December 9. By mid-December, the Taliban were removed 
from their previous strongholds. The pace at which members of the Northern Alliance 
moved was largely due to precise air support directed by tier one personnel armed with 
laser designating targeting systems.26 While the Taliban battled for control of 
Afghanistan’s cities, other special forces personnel raced to the mountains of Tora Bora 
to locate and destroy Osama Bin Laden and his organization. After nearly two weeks of 
fighting, Osama Bin Laden and other high ranking Al Qaeda leaders escaped Tora Bora 
through one of the many passes and crossed the border into Pakistan. The tactical 
disposition of the mountain positions, coupled with potential diplomatic issues if 
American forces entered Pakistan, complicated the mission.27 In mid-December, the 
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American-Afghan alliance had successfully removed the Taliban from power; however, 
fighting in Afghanistan continued. In 2002, American forces launched Operation 
Anaconda in the Shah-i-kot valley, hoping to dislodge Taliban fighters and capture high 
value targets. Unfortunately for the attacking force, Taliban resistance was stronger than 
anticipated, requiring significant air power to prevent disaster.28 American 
accomplishments by 2002 were certainly not insignificant; however, few signs indicated 
that the fight against the Taliban was over. 
In the years directly following the initial removal of the Taliban, the United States 
military was largely concerned with the ongoing conflict against insurgents in Iraq. From 
2002 until 2006, American forces in Afghanistan were concentrated on locating terrorist 
targets. Most security operations under the umbrella of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) which at that point, contained no more than six thousand 
American troops.29 However, beginning in 2003, the American military also began to 
explore counterinsurgency, largely centered around the development of host nation 
security forces.30 In 2002, the United States assumed responsibility for training the 
Afghan National Army (ANA); Afghanistan’s primary military force, comprised 
primarily of men from northern provinces. Training was originally designed to last 
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fourteen weeks, but as the Taliban reemerged in 2005-2006, units were placed 
haphazardly into the fight, many lacking proper training and equipment. By 2008, the 
ANA numbered 134,000, most of whom lacked the capacity to effectively combat the 
Taliban.31 
Despite the moves toward the creation of an armed service, the Afghan 
government, led by newly elected Hamid Karzai, had done little to court the sentiments 
of traditional Afghans living in the countryside. Failure on this front largely contributed 
to the Taliban’s resurgence in 2006. During this time, Taliban fighters and commanders 
crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan, and attacked eastern and southern portions of the 
country. Although NATO and American troops levels increased as a result of the 
hostilities, the ongoing conflict in Iraq made reinforcement and resource allocation 
difficult. By 2009, it was clear that American troop levels were insufficient to deter 
Taliban attacks. The Obama administration’s acknowledgement of the strategic 
disposition led to the decision to increase American troop levels to 100,000 by August 
2010. In addition to the troop increase, American commanders now displayed a new 
commitment to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.32 A major target of this new 
counterinsurgency campaign, was the southern province of Helmand. 
Helmand Province is one of Afghanistan’s southernmost provinces, neighbored 
between Kandahar to the east and Nimroz to the west. During the post-surge months, the 
aggressive insurgency inside Helmand made the province a primary objective of the 
American counterinsurgency campaign. In the months following 9/11, American aircraft 
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periodically bombed Helmand, but no special forces operated in the province. From 
October-November 2001, little ground-level fighting occurred, the only case being 
several clashes between mujahideen and Taliban fighters over control of the town of 
Marjah. The first American and British special forces, keeping with the primary coalition 
focus of hunting high-priority targets, arrived in Helmand in December to look for 
Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders.33 Snatch operations continued for several years 
(2003-2005); during that time, Helmandi civilians offered intelligence on possible targets. 
Listening to these tips was not always fruitful, as rivalries amongst tribal leaders often led 
to members giving false information that led to accidental arrests and killings. Arrests 
also damaged the image of the American military in a time when rebuilding required 
civilian support. 34 Although the early years of the conflict saw minimal troop 
commitment in Helmand, a reinvigorated Taliban soon demanded a change.  
 Shortly following the Taliban resurgence, British forces deployed to Helmand 
province. Originally focused on building security and stable government in the Helmand 
capital of Lashkar Gah. In June 2006, tensions began to rise as a result of Hamid Karzai’s 
dismissal of Helmand’s governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzadha. The dismissal of Sher 
Mohammad created an uneasy security environment, worsened by the growing Taliban 
threat. In the summer of 2006, the British (numbering no more than 500 troops) sent 
small units to protect towns in northern Helmand. The plan was met with fierce Taliban 
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resistance, making the hope of security unlikely unless the British units remained.35 In 
2007, additional troops arrived in Helmand and quickly began to seek out bands of 
Taliban fighters. Although British units found success in a number of conventional 
engagements, they had little success in maintaining territory following Taliban 
withdrawals. Beginning in 2008, British forces, in accordance to principals found in 
Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, began to work toward maintaining a hold on specific 
towns (primarily in northern Helmand) while also improving the capabilities of 
government forces.36 Although the British presence in Helmand evolved to address the 
needs of counterinsurgency, the small number of troops made province-wide security 
impossible. As the Marine units arriving in 2010 would attest, Helmand was still wild 
country.
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CHAPTER III- TOGETHER: OPERATION MOSHTARAK 
In 2014, Major General Sayed Malouk, commander of the Afghan 215th Corps, 
recounted his time working with American Marines. Though his experiences ranged from 
the Soviet war to the then ongoing fight against the Taliban and its allies, the town of 
Marjah held a strong memory for him. Following the major operation that significantly 
reduced the Taliban presence in the city, the ISAF established a presence there. Keeping 
with a major war aim of training Afghan security forces, Marines regularly patrolled with 
Soldiers of the Afghan National Army. According to Malouk, every Marine marched 
adjacent to an Afghan and vice versa. During one patrol, a group of men started across a 
wooden bridge spanning a canal in the middle of the city when an Afghan soldier fell into 
the canal. High water levels caused the soldier to quickly sink. Two Marines jumped into 
the canal in hopes of saving the man but were ultimately unsuccessful. Both the Afghan 
soldier and the Marines drowned. To Malouk, this incident was an impressive example of 
how the Marines treated their allies.37 Regardless of faction, the Marines on this patrol 
viewed the loss of an Afghan as a loss of one of their own.  
Marjah’s recent history is shrouded in a larger narrative of failure. America’s 
commitment of additional ground troops did not result in the expulsion of the Taliban 
from Afghanistan or Helmand province. However, incidents such as the one recounted by 
General Malouk are indicative of the determined effort of Marine units to not only pacify 
the town of Marjah, but also to ensure the development of an Afghan military capable of 
fighting the Taliban. These efforts were part of a larger goal of establishing an 
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environment in which humanitarian elements of counterinsurgency could take place. 
Counterinsurgency efforts in Marjah began with the conventional goal of pushing the 
Taliban out of the town. Although the Taliban continued to operate in Marjah following 
the initial ISAF assault, the environment had changed to a degree which permitted the 
Marines and their allies to enact COIN policies beyond traditional kinetic operations. 
Marine efforts in Marjah, while largely seen as ineffective in the overarching narrative, 
illustrated a competency in putting counterinsurgency doctrine into practice.   
The town of Marjah is in eastern Helmand, to the southwest of the provincial 
capital of Lashkar Gah. American military command during the time of the troop surge 
eyed the town as a major target. Prior to the assault in early 2010, Marjah was a Taliban 
stronghold that afforded them space to store explosives, along with weapons and 
ammunition. Drug traffic also emanated from the town; the Taliban supported poppy 
cultivation and the storing of opium prior to export. A series of canals running through 
the town gave defenders a multitude of strong positions to combat any offensive move 
from the ISAF.38 Marjah’s condition in 2010 was the result of an overall lack of support 
from the Afghan government and its allies. In the early years of America’s war, Marjah 
was a focus of poppy eradication for the Afghan government. However, these efforts 
were ostensibly ineffective, because the government did not have the logistical means to 
support eradication long-term. Maintaining control of Marjah between 2001 and 2008 
was arduous, considering the overall lack of American support in the south prior to the 
surge. From 2006 to 2008, frustration with the government’s inconsistent eradication 
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efforts and seeming inability to provide security, led to resentment of government forces. 
During this time, bombing attacks against Afghan soldiers and police became 
commonplace.39  
Festering resentment in Marjah ultimately culminated in the Taliban’s seizure of 
the town in September 2008. The Taliban quickly established its own form of governance 
that largely reflecting strict adherence to their religious beliefs and strict punishment for 
those who failed to cooperate or committed crimes. In 2009, two raids were conducted 
into Marjah. The first raid, conducted in March, was undertaken by British, Afghan, and 
Dutch troops with the purpose of interfering with Taliban operations and making the 
ISAF presence known to the people. The second raid occurred in May and was centered 
on the Loy Chareh bazaar, a place of significant narcotics traffic. While both raids were 
successful, ISAF forces ultimately withdrew in both cases, as they lacked sufficient 
means to maintain a presence in the town.40 In early 2010, the population of Marjah was 
estimated between 70,000 and 80,000 people, with a Taliban force between 400-1,000 
fighters.41 Completely ousting the Taliban from Marjah required a significant ground 
force. The decision to inject additional American military power into Afghanistan 
beginning in 2010, gave the ISAF an opportunity to achieve this goal.  
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The raids conducted in early 2009 proved the necessity of the counterinsurgent 
principle of holding onto areas of previous insurgent activity. According to Warfighting 
Publication 3-33.5, “HN [Host Nation] forces and other counterinsurgents must establish 
control of one or more areas from which to operate. HN forces must secure the people 
continuously within these areas.”42 Successful security, as far as the authors of 3-.33.5 
were concerned, required the partnership of host-nation and counterinsurgent forces. 
Together, they work to quell lingering threats (since eliminating an insurgency will not 
likely happen quickly) and prove themselves capable of security a population. The two 
raids successfully cleared targeted areas of insurgents, but the inability to maintain a 
presence in Marjah resulted in the Taliban’s return once ISAF personnel withdrew. Any 
hope of successfully ending Marjah’s history as a Taliban stronghold required the ISAF 
to stay in the town and facilitate change.  
Marjah posed a significant challenge to the United States and its allies. Given the 
overarching war aim of securing the Afghan people from Taliban influence. Brigadier 
General Lawrence Nicholson, ranking Marine commander in Afghanistan, was aware of 
the challenge that awaited ISAF forces once a full-scare counterinsurgency campaign was 
launched in the city: 
We were very careful while we were there not to use the F-word, the Fallujah 
word.  We didn't want to draw unfair and just not sound comparisons between 
Fallujah and Marjah, but at the end of the day what we found was there were a lot 
of similarities, in the sense that like Fallujah pre-Al-Fajr, it had become no-go 
terrain for us.  It had become sort of an isolated area, where at one point Al Qaida 
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in Fallujah and the Taliban in Afghanistan had taken refuge, had taken sanctuary, 
and had run the area.  They had their own government, they had their own jurists.  
They arbitrated civil disputes.  They had their own defense.  They had their own 
police.  There were people in uniform running around in Marjah.  Previous 
Taliban had started really setting up their own government, so for all intents and 
purposes it was an autonomous republic, and nobody from the government of 
Afghanistan or the Coalition ever went in there.43 
Nicholson drew comparisons to Fallujah, a city located in Anbar province in Iraq. In 
2004, American forces launched two offensives against the city, which was held by a 
significant force of Sunni insurgents. Fallujah fell in late 2004, but not before coalition 
troops battled for nearly every square mile. Though the Marjah raids in 2009 had 
achieved some immediate success in clearing specific areas, completely pushing the 
insurgency out demanded a significant operation to fully expel the Taliban, a prospect 
that elicited the comparisons to Fallujah.  
 In May 2009, General David McKiernan, commander of all American and allied 
forces in Afghanistan, was replaced by General Stanley McChrystal. In the months 
following his appointment, McChrystal assessed the state of Afghanistan and the progress 
made against the insurgency. As a result of his findings, the Obama administration green-
lit the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops throughout the succeeding months. The 
surge in troops strength, in McChrystal’s mind, allowed the United States to increase its 
focus on counterinsurgency. However, the surge came with an eighteen-month time line, 
 




after which American troops were to begin transitioning out of Afghanistan altogether. 44 
McChrystal wasted little time in kicking off this new phase of America’s war in 
Afghanistan. Marjah became one of the first locations in which this newly invigorated 
counterinsurgent campaign would take effect. Unlike previous operations in Marjah and 
elsewhere, where quick disruptive strikes ended in the ceding of gained ground back to 
insurgent forces, the post-surge operation implied a longer time commitment. Post-surge 
operations in Marjah held the goal of maintaining a presence in the town and connecting 
with the civilians, unlike previous raids. Strategically thinking, a major move on Marjah 
served the benefit of reducing potential Taliban killings and bombings in nearby Lashkar 
Gah. Additionally, it would illustrate to the Afghan people that the Afghan government 
and its allies were working toward a Taliban-free Afghanistan.45  
 Dubbed Operation Moshtarak (Dari word for “together”), the operation to wrestle 
Marjah from the Taliban was slated to begin on February 13 and involve American, 
Afghan, and British personnel. The primary combat units included both the 1st and 3rd 
Marine battalions of the 6th Marine Regiment augmented with ANA soldiers. The 
presence of ANA troops represented the ISAF desire to give the Afghan government a 
key role in the fight for central Helmand. In the days leading to the assault, aircraft flew 
over the town, dropping leaflets to the civilians remaining.46 The leaflets dropped into 
Marjah contained a message of warning to the civilians. Removing the insurgency from 
Marjah was the primary objective of the operation; however, such an operational 
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environment held the potential for significant collateral damage. The warning given to 
the people of Marjah was an attempt to reduce the number of civilians in the town during 
the upcoming battle. Sources vary in the estimated number of refugees that fled to 
surrounding areas; however, it was clear that many non-combatants remained in the 
town.47 The task of clearing Marjah of the Taliban was simple in theory, but the presence 
of civilians complicated the matter. Civilian security, in the case of Marjah, held more 
importance than the simple elimination of insurgent forces. Once the major thrust into the 
town was concluded, long-term security operations would begin. Collateral damage 
would only damage the reputation of Marines who hoped to interact with civilians 
following the attack.  
 Operation Moshtarak began on the morning of February 13 when elements of 
both 1/6 and 3/6 Marines, along with their Afghan allies, began the haphazard process of 
clearing the town. Bravo company of the 1/6 Battalion, commanded by Captain Timothy 
Sparks, saw some of the heaviest fighting in and around Marjah. Prior to the operation, 
ISAF commanders such as McChrystal, reinforced the importance of the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE), which dictated that deadly force may only be used against 
individuals who clearly display deadly intent. Such a policy was a necessary precaution 
in preventing civilian casualties, but there were many who viewed the ROE as a 
dangerous hindrance to troops on the ground. Sparks understood this concern, but the 
regulations had changed little in his view. Never had he fought an engagement in which 
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his unit was authorized to treat a force as hostile (without verification). In the fall of 
2009, prior to the battalion’s deployment, the Marines were notified of a possible assault 
in an urban environment. Prior knowledge of what to expect in Helmand gave Sparks a 
chance to put his men through urban training before they deployed. The training involved 
running men through chest high grasses and clearing buildings. Most importantly, Sparks 
trained his men to make decisions within the parameters of the ROE. In his mind, the 
question of “can” was far less important than the question of “should” when deciding to 
engage enemy forces. By running his men through scenarios that required them to make 
quick decisions of ethics, he hoped to lessen the potential for civilian casualties and 
frustration with the ROE. In his mind, progress in Marjah would begin on the first day of 
combat operations.48  
 Embedded with Bravo Company was British journalist Ben Anderson, who 
followed Sparks and other members of the company as they pushed into Marjah from the 
south. Anderson’s documentary of the battle highlights the aggressive nature of the 
Taliban. Civilian sightings began shortly after the start of the operation; a clear sign that 
the leaflets failed to result in wholesale evacuation of the town. Hindered by the 
placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and stiff resistance from the Taliban 
defenders, progress for Bravo was slow. Training in quick moral decision-making 
quickly became relevant, as the Taliban sought to use the Americans’ ROE to their 
advantage. On the third day of the operation, Bravo pushed to the northeast portion of the 
town, where several Marines occupied a rooftop that commanded a powerful westward 
 





view. From there, the Marines could easily see movement in the surrounding fields and 
buildings. However, this new position was clearly visible to Taliban fighters occupying 
positions to the west, causing intense fire to break out. As the fighting continued, a 
Marine armed with a marksman rifle called out a group of people moving laterally at a 
distance of several hundred yards, using women as cover. Anderson’s footage shows the 
group cross into and out of the Marines’ line of sight without taking fire from them. 49  
 The civilian presence in Marjah, as visible in Andersons footage, placed fire 
discipline and leadership at great importance. Though the opening phase of ISAF COIN 
in Marjah was kinetic, elements of counterinsurgency doctrine were at play. The 
application of force was necessary in clearing Marjah, but excessive force could prove 
counterproductive in the long-term. Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 notes that 
“counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied 
and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is 
counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more 
insurgents.”50 Given the goal of establishing rapport with Afghan civilians, careful 
decision making was needed to ensure the safety of civilians during the assault. Captain. 
Sparks’ readiness training seemingly proved beneficial to his marines, as they faced fire 
from insurgents willing to use civilians as shields. Additionally, Bravo refrained from 
utilizing means of indirect fire, such as mortars, on Taliban targets. Given the rapid pace 
in which the company maneuvered through the town, and the likelihood of civilian 
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casualties, more precise means were employed. Javelins, light anti-tank weapons 
(LAWs), and M203 grenade launchers (attached under the barrel of an M4 rifle) were 
preferred over mortars and airstrikes. Though airstrikes could be called in with precision, 
rockets and grenades often had more accuracy and were fired by Marines who had visuals 
on the desired targets.51 Hesitancy in the use of artillery and air support illustrated a 
commitment to the counterinsurgency mission and a willingness of the American military 
to put its personnel at additional risk for the benefit of the COIN process. 
Although Bravo Company inflicted no civilian casualties during the Marjah 
assault, civilian casualties in were not completely avoidable for other elements of the 
assault force. As with the Marines in Bravo Company, other units taking part in 
Moshtarak engaged Taliban fighters ensconced in positions with civilians nearby (such as 
homes and shops). Brigadier General Mohiudin Ghori, commander of Afghan forces 
during the assault, explained to media outlets that Taliban fighters forced civilians to 
stand in front of them while they fired at oncoming ISAF forces.52 Civilians wanting to 
leave once the assault began were prevented from doing so by the fighting itself and the 
IEDs placed throughout the town. By February 18, five days into the operation, NATO 
reported fifteen civilian fatalities while Afghan sources claimed that at least nineteen had 
been killed.53 The physical proximity of civilians to the Taliban proved devastating to the 
morale of Charlie Company of the 1/6, when one of their rockets hit a house where three 
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families were sheltered. The blast caused fifteen casualties, four of them (a woman and 
three children) fatalities. To accept responsibility for the incident, Marines visited the 
grieving father to deliver a payment of $10,000 ($2,500 for each life lost). The Marine in 
charge of the group stated “there is no way to rationalize that this was, in any way, a good 
thing or justified. Its just a terrible feeling and a terrible sight.”54  
Incidents like this were harmful not only to the morale of the Marines who strove 
for precision when clearing civilian areas, but also to the civilians, who now found 
themselves surrounded by death and destruction. Though no method exists to undo the 
damage done to Afghan families, American forces strove to mitigate the negative 
perception that collateral damage attracted. Unfortunately for the counterinsurgents, 
accidental civilian casualties gave the Taliban opportunity to spread rumors of coalition 
brutality. Marjah, along with other areas in southern Afghanistan were places in which 
the Taliban met little resistance. Lack of significant government or coalition presence 
allowed them to control the information spread to civilians. Whether through meetings 
with tribal elders or other forms of propaganda, the Taliban expressed their determination 
to outlast their NATO enemy.55 Their proximity and connections with the civilian 
population created the need for the ISAF to engage the Taliban both kinetically and 
through the spreading of information. Part of the reinvigoration of counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan was openness with media outlets on the ground. Civilian casualties during 
2009 and 2010 offensives were handled with transparency by ISAF leaders, who 
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communicated each major incident to the media.56 Openness in the media, along with 
condolence visits and payments, were ways in which the Marine Corps and the ISAF as a 
whole, worked to express their commitment to expelling the Taliban and combat its 
attempt at creating false narratives regarding American intentions. 
Limiting civilian casualties (though rarely possible in war) was the primary 
concern of American and allied forces during Operation Moshtarak. However, Operation 
Moshtarak also placed great importance on the cooperation between American and 
Afghan forces. Elements of 1/6 and 3/6 Marines, which comprised the bulk of the assault 
force, operated alongside government troops down to the squad level.57 Alpha Company 
of 1/6 was one of several Marine companies that was augmented by Afghan soldiers. 
During the assault phase of Operation Moshtarak, each of Alpha’s platoons operated with 
an additional twelve to twenty Afghan soldiers. Gunnery Sergeant Jonathan Graham 
recalled that the Afghan soldiers in his company were interested in knowing how the 
Marines operated but were afraid to do their part once combat commenced. Rather than 
the Afghans taking initiative, the Marines in Alpha Company had to give them more 
frequent instruction as the battle dragged on.58  
The experience of an Afghan soldier during the assault on Marjah was certainly a 
strange one. Sergeant John Trickler of Alpha Company 1/6 reflected on the assault in an 
interview in 2011. When Alpha Company began its assault before sunrise on February 
13, the Marines were equipped with night vision equipment that the Afghans (nearly 140 
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men total) did not have, allowing them to see things their allies could not. Adding to the 
confusion was the fact that most ANA soldiers did not speak English. When they arrived, 
the Marines in Trickler’s platoon instructed their Afghan comrades to follow them. 
During the initial insertion, many of the ANA troops became confused; those who did not 
hold onto a Marine (equipped with night vision) could not see where they were supposed 
to go. Fortunately for the Afghan soldiers near Trickler, an Afghan squad leader was 
nearby (holding onto Trickler) and was able to keep the men going in the proper 
direction.59 The insertion was a clear sign of the technological and tactical disparity 
between the Afghan soldiers and the Marines sent to Afghanistan to assist them. Despite 
disparity, the direction of the Marines and a handful of effective leaders kept the assault 
organized. 
Bravo Company of 1/6 Battalion was accompanied by a company of nearly ninety 
Afghan troops. When the ANA arrived, they split themselves into three platoons (from an 
original two) and each paired with a platoon of Marines. Each Afghan platoon had a 
platoon leader, sergeant, and squad leaders. Each squad of Marines had an Afghan 
element (Afghan Squad) that was roughly the size of a Marine fire team (three to five 
men). The ANA company attached to Bravo was led by a man who, according to Captain 
Sparks, was effective in engaging with his men and Afghan civilians. However, the 
commander was grossly overweight and could not carry his own combat gear (a task he 
delegated to one of his subordinates). Sparks suspected that the commander purchased his 
commission in Kabul.60 The men under his command received no more than five weeks 
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of training before being assigned a commander and combat assignment. Bravo received 
their ANA guests early enough to go through training exercises during the planning phase 
of the operation. Training covered basic battle drills rather than situations unique to 
Marjah, providing the Afghan soldiers with a sense of how the Marines of Bravo would 
operate once Moshtarak kicked off. Bravo Company conducted ten live-fire sessions with 
the ANA and trained them in platoon movements. First Lieutenant Anthony Piccioni 
trained with the Afghans and noted how well they emulated the Marines’ movements.61 
The additional time afforded to the Marines of Bravo, allowed them to get a sense of how 
their allies would perform in combat. Combat presented challenges for the Afghan troops, 
but it also prepared them for future operations in a much more effective manner than their 
previous training.   
Teaching poorly trained host nation troops how to operate in stressful combat 
environments is an essential component to counterinsurgency. The need to give Afghan 
soldiers frequent direction during the assault was, to a degree, representative of the need 
to adopt an approach to Helmand province that placed the training of host nation forces 
above killing Taliban fighters. Operation Moshtarak was far from the Marine Corps’ first 
foray into combined action. During the Vietnam War, Marines often operated in 
Vietnamese villages as counterinsurgents. Long-term security often required Marine 
platoons to integrate with Vietnamese popular forces; men who did not serve in the Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), but instead provided security for villages. Units of 
Marines and popular forces were known as Combined Action Platoons (CAP). Small, 
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integrated units such as a CAP were meant to create operational efficiency in local 
military forces and ensure long-term stability in small villages.62 This concept was one 
which the experts behind 3-33.5 sought to apply a similar concept to American 
interactions in counterinsurgency zones.  
The minds behind 3-33.5 had a similar idea for CAP units in post 9/11 combat 
zones. These units are defined as a mix of American and host nation troops. Rather than 
operating in areas of heavy combat, CAP units worked in areas in which insurgent 
activity was limited. Crucial to success is the unit’s ability to establish a permanent 
presence amongst the civilian population. Combined units should not, according to the 
manual, be used as a clearing force. Instead, the units were meant to operate in areas 
already cleared of major enemy activity. Should the need for additional strength arise, 
those units would be made available upon request.63 Unlike Vietnam, Marines in 
Afghanistan integrated government troops into their units. Once major combat operations 
in Marjah ended, a new phase of Moshtarak began, one that required the ideological 
separation of the Taliban and the civilians of Marjah. Insurgent activity would continue, 
albeit at a smaller scale than before the operation began. Marines continued to integrate 
ANA troops into their units (down to the squad level) and worked with police forces. 
Such heavy interaction served to increase Afghan operational competency while also 
working to create an environment in which the locals were inclined to interact with them.  
 Units tasked with wresting Marjah from the Taliban focused first on seizing the 
center of the town and the main bazaars. Once these areas were under ISAF control 
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(approximately ten days after D-day), Marines pushed outward and secured all major 
bridges spanning the canals and routes leading into the town. Once established, 
bridgehead positions helped control population movement. By the fifteenth day of the 
operation, most of the major fighting concluded. Among the first additional personnel 
brought into Marjah were members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police 
(ANCOP).64 From the tenth day of Operation Moshtarak, ANCOP personnel began to 
take positions in the two Bazaars in town (Loy Chareh and Koru Chareh). Although the 
kinetic phase of Operation Moshtarak was largely successful in reducing the Taliban’s 
hold on Marjah, danger continued to loom large. The days directly following the 
conclusion of major offensive operations were quiet, but in mid-March, Marines and 
Afghan security forces in peripheral positions fell under sporadic attacks from Taliban 
fighters. It was also reported that the Taliban was beginning to harass civilians and 
threaten those who worked with American and Afghan government forces.65 Concerns 
for ANCOPs implementation in Marjah were perhaps justified, as ANCOP units were 
most frequently deployed after combat units in the ISAF and ANA restored order. 
However, sporadic acts of violence by the Taliban required ANCOP personnel to carry 
out actions typically designated to traditional military units, rather than their assigned 
role of ensuring stability for the Helmandis of Marjah. Many of the ANCOP personnel 
sent to Marjah following the launch of Moshtarak were new recruits. High casualties in 
the organization meant that many ANCOP units sent to Helmand in early 2010 were 
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inexperienced and ill-suited to perform duties beyond the simplistic role originally given 
to civil order police. Furthermore, the majority of ANCOP recruits came from northern 
Afghanistan and spoke Dari, while most of Marjah’s civilian population (like most 
people living in southern Afghanistan) spoke Pashto.66  
In the months following the start of Moshtarak, ANCOP units were placed at 
various points throughout the town. Reports assessing ANCOP’s overall performance in 
Marjah show an organization largely unprepared to carry out the role presented to them. 
Instances of drug use, theft from civilians who passed through security checkpoints, and 
absenteeism were common occurrences in Marjah.67 Despite cases of negligence and a 
seeming lack of readiness on part of ANCOP, there were members of the organization 
who were willing to learn from the Marines. Gunnery Sergeant Jonathan Graham worked 
closely with ANCOP during his time at Marjah and was often tasked with placing Afghan 
security at various checkpoints. ANCOP in Marjah, according to Graham, typically 
maintained static positions at the Bazars and bridges to insure the safe travel of civilians 
and prevent potential insurgent activity. Although Graham thought the police should 
patrol rather than stand guard, his insistence that the ANA should perform these duties 
were insufficient to change the minds of those organizing ISAF and Afghan deployment 
in his zones. Regardless, the ANCOP personnel he interacted with effectively carried out 
their police duties. On one occasion, Graham received word that an armed man was 
attempting to rob a local pharmacy. He accompanied the police to the site, where they 
exchanged fire with the armed man, ultimately killing him. Events like this painted a 
 
66 Van Ess, “The Battle for Marjah,” 22-23. 
67 Perito, “Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police,” 7. 
 
41 
hopeful picture of what ANCOP was capable of when properly utilized. In reflecting on 
his experiences with Afghan security forces, he contended that ANCOP was more 
effective in its duties than the Afghan army. 68 Graham’s concerns about the use of 
ANCOP and his rapport with them are indicative of the Marines’ ability to work with the 
police and make suggestions regarding the efficacy of their use in the field. 
Unfortunately, events such as rapid recruitment and deployment, along with the inability 
to make larger tactical decisions, restricted the implementation of more effective uses of 
Afghan personnel.  
In addition to the Marine infantry units that interacted with Afghan police forces, 
the Marine Corps had personnel working in the Afghan National Security Forces Cell 
(ANSF Cell). Marine Colonel Burke Whitman ran the ANSF Cell at the behest of Major 
General Nicholson. The Cell was responsible for training and placing Afghan security 
forces throughout Afghanistan before transitioning combat control over to them once 
ISAF forces withdrew en-masse. In the days following Marines’ successful taking of the 
town center, ANCOP was sent in. By early April 500 ANCOP personnel operated in 
Marjah as three units. Once ANCOP began operations in Marjah, the Cell received word 
of corruption in one of the units. Upon hearing this news, Whitman and his team traveled 
to northern Marjah where the unit was stationed. 69 Initial screenings revealed twenty-five 
percent of the unit (of 178 police) used drugs.70 Those that tested positive were removed 
from the unit and area of operation, while those remaining received additional training. 
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Whitman noticed that once the Cell was finished revamping the unit, it was a more 
effective force. The Cell soon began receiving reports that the unit “was focused on the 
right things, they’re proud to be the force they are, and were also hearing the difference 
from the population. The Marine battalion commander down there with 3/6 describes 
them as ‘an all new force.’”71 Although the opening weeks of Moshtarak were focused on 
kinetic operations, the presence of the Cell illustrates a significant level of commitment to 
the counterinsurgent mission. Marines in Marjah working with ANCOP officers, had at 
their disposal, personnel awaiting their assessment of Afghan security forces. Motivations 
and commitment certainly varied among each Afghan officer; however, the Marine Corps 
possessed elements able to address issues with discipline as they appeared.  
In addition to ANCOP personnel, Marines working to keep Taliban strength down 
after the Marjah assault, also worked with soldiers of the ANA. Directly following the 
assault, central Marjah was the most secured area. Taliban activity in outlying areas made 
it necessary for Marines and Afghan forces to maintain pressure on the Taliban while also 
working to ease civilian tensions. Much like they had done in the assault on Marjah in 
mid-February. Alpha Company of the 1/6 continued to pair with Afghan soldiers as they 
responded to Taliban activity. Paramount to the clearing efforts was the need for the 
ANA troops to gain experience in urban warfare. When clearing buildings, the Marines 
ensured that ANA soldiers were the first to enter.72 Afghan participation in clearing 
activities also led into civilian interaction. Prior to investigating building in which 
insurgent activity was suspected, Marines sent ANA soldiers to speak with residents, 
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notifying them of what they were doing.73 In the minds of the counterinsurgents, host 
nations troops must put themselves at the vanguard of operations. Doing so allows 
civilians to see how government troops operate, creating potential for future relationships 
to form. 
At the end of March 2010, Battalion 1/6 welcomed the 2nd Kandak (battalion size 
force) into their battlespace. The Marines of Bravo company noticed a decline in the 
general performance of the ANA once the transition occurred. Captain Sparks of Bravo 
Company noted that their new ANA partners were nowhere near the level of combat 
readiness of the Marines or the previous ANA unit (which they had prior training with). 
Cases of drug use, inappropriate sexual acts in the rest areas, and poor hygiene were 
common among the new ANA personnel. However, the men were eager to learn from the 
Marines, and their leadership was much more effective than the previous one. 74 
Although counterinsurgents have their own personnel to improve the operational 
capabilities of their host nation allies, host nation military leadership is a crucial 
component if healthy relationships between civilian and military actors can form. 
According to Manual 3-33.5, host nation military leadership in an essential element in the 
construction of an effective and discerning military force. Units without effective 
leadership are more prone to making mistakes and damaging relations with civilians.75 
According to Col. Whitman of the Cell, ANA leadership held potential for training non-
commissioned officers in the police forces. Recruiting officers in southern province was 
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difficult, due to a lack of literate candidates. The Cell recognized the potential in having 
ANA officers assist in the education of potentially effective leaders whose only perceived 
fault was lack of literacy. Their goal was to place proven leaders in positions where they 
could benefit ANA recruits.76In Marjah, and other areas of Helmand, host nation 
leadership was an essential component to any unit hoping to one day operate sans Marine 
support.  
The presence of Afghan soldiers in areas such as Marjah both augmented the 
fighting strength of the Marine battalions and helped to close the gap between the ISAF 
and civilians. Counterinsurgency largely depends on maintaining constructive relations 
with native populations. In Afghanistan, such bridges were built through ISAF presence 
at shuras; gatherings of village elders and decision-makers. By April, Lieutenant Colonel 
Calvert Worth of Battalion 1/6 had begun to take a lessened role in tribal meetings and 
ensure that ANA commanders did most of the talking. Though civil affairs projects took 
time to begin in earnest, meetings between Marjah’s civilian leaders and the ANA helped 
to clarity details on work projects and build trust.77 
Population engagement is crucial in counterinsurgency. Although men hold the 
most power in Afghan society, the authors of 3-33.5 recognized the crucial role women 
have within a family. Furthermore, counterinsurgents must recognize that insurgents may 
garner support from social circles formed by women. Manual 3-33.5 argues the 
importance of counterinsurgents appealing to women in insurgent environments. Female 
support of counterinsurgent efforts will increase the likelihood of support from families.78 
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The idea that women held significant influence over familial support of an insurgency led 
to the creation of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in 2009. The first FETs 
accompanied Afghan police forces to homes in Farah province suspected of housing 
Taliban fighters. Female Marines entered the homes with the police and doled out 
hygiene products and other supplies and spoke with women while police spoke to the 
men.79 Marine Battalion 1/6 received several FETs in early April. At that time, local 
reception to ISAF was tepid, due to the remaining threat of Taliban fighters and the 
threats they continued to make.80 However, by May 2010, four FETs operated in Marjah 
(two in the north, two in the south). The two southern teams had established relationships 
with several influential families by early June, allowing them to gather intelligence.81 
Though relationship building was an ongoing process, efforts made by FETs and ANA 
led shuras served to close the distance between civilians and the counterinsurgents trying 
to keep insurgents out of their communities. 
What made Marjah such a crucial stronghold for the Taliban was the farmland. 
Marjah is surrounded by more than 300,000 acres of arable land, most of which was 
utilized in the cultivation of poppy. The Taliban relied on the drug processing and 
trafficking from Marjah as a primary source of income. Opium exports in the years 
leading to Moshtarak garnered nearly three billion dollars per year (of which farmers 
received hardly one fifth). Drug money from areas like Marjah allowed the Taliban to 
recruit additional fighters and pay for weapons and ammunition. Poppy cultivation was 
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far more profitable for farmers, for whom poppy earned nearly three times more than 
wheat or corn.82  In the months following the start of Moshtarak, the ISAF began to offer 
payment ($300 per hectare) to farmers willing to destroy their poppy and start growing 
other crops. Unfortunately for the civilians, the money offered was far less than they 
would receive for selling the poppy.83  
Payment incentives were one of few apparent solutions to convince farmers that 
growing other crops was in their best interest. Some farmers continued to farm poppy; 
however, Marine and Afghan military checkpoints throughout Marjah naturally 
complicated the process of transporting the crop out of Marjah. Though not an official 
policy, some American commanders hoped that forcing poppy farmers to use other 
channels to conduct their business would help to reduce Taliban profits.84 The desire to 
limit Taliban profits while also building trust with Marjah’s civilian population made the 
prospect of poppy eradication problematic. Since the ISAF could not afford to enforce 
complete eradication out of fear of alienating the locals, the only apparent solution was to 
offer new options and hope that farmers would accept them. Though eradication was a 
concern, so too was the well-being of the Afghan farmer. Rather than force eradication, 
the ISAF placed importance in locating drug traffickers. Such an approach recognized the 
Afghan farmer as a victim of the Taliban’s financial system.85 Though the lingering 
presence of poppy (albeit at a smaller scale) held potential for Taliban financiers, the cost 
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of aggressive eradication would certainly alienate civilian farmers trying to make a 
living. In the case of Marjah, refusal to make eradication mandatory was the lesser evil.  
 The process of counterinsurgency in Marjah continued past the conclusion of 
Operation Moshtarak in 2010. Units deployed to Marjah in June 2010 maintained the 
operational cadence set by the Marine units who took part in the assault. In September 
2010, Marine security allowed schools to reopen. A national parliamentary election also 
occurred in 2010, in which the ANA and ANCOP provided security (Marines serving 
solely as overwatch).86 Data from the election indicated a small voter turnout (935 votes), 
but educational gains were much more promising. The number of enrolled students in 
Marjah was higher than 1,000 in 2011, an increase of 800 from the previous year. 
Additionally, more than 100 girls now attended school; an opportunity denied them under 
Taliban control.87Maintaining security was certainly a priority for the Marines; however, 
other civil affairs projects continued at a remarkable rate. In 2011, Marine civil affairs 
officers of the District Stabilization Team recognized that not all projects started in the 
previous year. Major Timothy Flynn and Staff Sergeant Carlos Delgadomartinez worked 
with the district government and Afghan civilians to ensure the relevancy of projects in 
Marjah. During their deployment in 2011, projects were underway to construct a high 
school, mosque, and health clinic. Roads linking Marjah to the Helmand capital of 
Lashkar Gah were also under construction. Within the city, new gravel roads were 
created, which were more difficult to plant IEDs on. Flynn and Delgadomartinez met 
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with civilians in shuras and relayed their needs to the government. They ensured that 
requests for new projects were relayed to government decision makers and that money 
was not simply given to civilians.88  
Civilian counterinsurgents also worked with the Marines in Marjah. Ralph Hinds, 
a population and health development officer attached to Marjah’s District Stabilization 
Team, worked to ensure sanitation standards among the civilian population. Basic 
sanitation created many health problems for people living in the town. Unfortunately, 
information was most effectively transferred through demonstration, as illiteracy was 
common. To better spread knowledge of proper hygienic practices, Hatton and his 
colleagues gave handed out pamphlets containing illustrated instructions for the 
prevention of various maladies. Other health efforts included the construction of public 
water pumps; safer alternatives to the common practice of drawing water from the canals 
(which often caused illness for those drinking it).89 Philip Hatton, a civilian member of 
the District Stabilization Team noted in a 2011 interview, that the projects underway in 
2011 were having a positive impact on life in Marjah. He also argued that civilian 
counterinsurgent actors in Marjah were woefully unprepared for the workload demanded 
of them. Fortunately, Col. Randall Newman, commander of Regimental Combat Team 7 
(commanding officer during Moshtarak) recognized the issue and promoted cooperation 
with Marine units which were much more capable. 90 The experiences of both Hinds and 
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Hatton illustrate the work done by civilian counterinsurgents, work largely supported by 
Marines.  
 In the weeks following the conclusion of the Marjah assault in 2010, General 
Stanley McChrystal arrived in Marjah to assess the situation. By that time, the Taliban 
had begun to launch attacks on peripheral areas and intimidate locals. McChrystal 
expressed his frustrations on the lack of progress in fully securing the town. His 
subordinates explained that the completion of any counterinsurgency mission in Marjah 
would take time. In McChrystal’s mind, time was fleeting, as American drawdown was 
set to begin in July 2011.91 The coming drawdown likely influenced other evaluations of 
the Marjah campaign. A report filed by the International Council on Security and 
Development published in March 2010, contained statistics gathered from a series of 
interviews with 427 civilians from nearby Lashkar Gah, many of whom had families in 
Marjah. The data revealed that 61 percent of people felt worse about NATO troops than 
they had before Moshtarak. Another statistic revealed that most of the interviewees were 
unhappy with NATO forces.92 The sentiments shared by ranking officers, researchers, 
and even media sources reveal a narrative of failure. However, what they do not reveal 
are the processes of counterinsurgency carried out by Marine units and their civilian and 
Afghan allies. Counterinsurgency policy first and foremost, demands that 
counterinsurgents expend time to fully secure a location and build relations with 
civilians. Hardships in the early months (and even years) of ISAF operations reflected 
flaws in the overall strategy, but time constraints denied American forces the opportunity 
 
91 Chandresekaran, Little America, 145-146. 
92 The International Council on Security and Development “Operation Moshtarak: Lessons 
Learned” May 2010,  2-5 https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moshtarak1.pdf  
 
50 
to exploit the policies that showed promise. Narratives of failure, which started shortly 
after the onset of Moshtarak, betray a lack of understanding of the counterinsurgency 
process, and overshadows the fact that the Marjah Marines carried out policies that 







CHAPTER IV - SANGINGRAD 
On one spring morning in 2012, corporal Nicholaus Solecki of the 1st Battalion, 
7th Marine Regiment, arrived in Sangin district, Afghanistan. Having been transferred to a 
small patrol base, Solecki took part in regular patrols with soldiers of the Afghan 
National Army. The first few Afghan soldiers to arrive at the base approached Solecki in 
an old Ford Ranger (commonly given to Afghan soldiers by the American military). The 
soldier manning the machine gun loosely bolted to the floor, jumped off the back after 
retrieving a large garbage bag filled with marijuana. Solecki watched with bewilderment 
as the soldier gave him the thumbs up saying “double good” and retreated with his 
comrades into a small hut where they smoked with little interruption for several days. His 
first encounter was a telltale sign of what was to come, as the task of preparing ANA 
troops to operate independently was met with significant issues.93 Solecki’s experience in 
carrying out counterinsurgency strategy, like that of so many others, was influenced by a 
myriad of operational hindrances in Sangin. 
 From the significant troop increase that led to a revamped campaign in 2010, to 
significant American drawdown in 2014, American Marines worked to combat a 
persistent and aggressive insurgency in Sangin District. Located in the northeastern 
portion of the province, Sangin is home to nearly 15,000 Pashtuns. Much of Sangin’s 
population consists of farmers, all utilizing the Helmand river to the west as their main 
source of irrigation.94Counterinsurgency in Sangin required Marines to adhere to 
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guidelines developed in 3-33.5, such as working closely with Afghan soldiers. 
Additionally, the Marines consistently shouldered additional risk by conducting regular 
patrols in civilian areas in hopes of establishing friendly contact with Afghan civilians. 
As time passed, the Marines took casualties, but continued to strive for complete control 
of Sangin and its establishment as a Taliban-free zone. However, despite the presence of 
Marines in civilian areas, the gift of everyday supplies, the advising/training efforts, and 
the constant risk taking on part of the Marines, there was little glory to be had in the 
district. Progress was certainly made between 2010 and 2014, but any chance at full 
victory required factors beyond the power of a Marine to control. Counterinsurgency 
doctrine was not the arbiter of failure, rather an unwillingness of the United States 
Government to commit its military to Afghanistan past 2014, poor leadership within the 
Afghan military and its apparent unwillingness to accept the burden of complete combat 
control. Although the Sangin Marines closely followed official COIN doctrine, time 
constraints on the American presence, coupled with a lack of fighting will on part of the 
ANA troops, made Sangin an unwinnable district.  
 Sangin district had proved problematic for British Marines stationed there in the 
years prior to the American troop surge. The district is home to several “Green Zones,” 
areas prime for poppy growth and Taliban activity. Since 2006, the district was primarily 
under the occupation of British forces. The British took significant casualties; nearly 100 
of the 300 British personnel killed in Afghanistan were killed in Sangin. The district was 
a hotbed of insurgent activity; British Marines regularly encountered resistance whilst on 
patrol; Taliban fighters placed IEDs along roadways and machinegun positions in 
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fields.95 Such staunch pushback made the task of pacifying the district’s towns daunting. 
Sangin held significant value for the Taliban and the US/Britain, as the crucial Route 611 
ran through it. The Taliban sought to control the road because that linked Sangin to 
Lashkar Gah, Helmand’s capital and a vein through which to send fighters into 
neighboring provinces. The road also ran to a crucial hydroelectric dam that provided 
electricity to more than one million civilians. In 2010, when 30,000 additional American 
troops were sent to assist General Stanley McChrystal’s war effort, the decision was 
made to build another turbine. In order to achieve this goal, Route 611 needed security. In 
addition to the need for another turbine, the objective in controlling Sangin was to 
provide security to local populations and restrict Taliban activity. Roving bands of 
Taliban, many of whom traveled in pickup trucks and extorted the civilians, made 
security tenuous.96 The ferocious effort exerted by the Taliban and the severe losses 
suffered when British and American troops ventured outside the security of forward 
operating bases, earned Sangin the nickname “Sangingrad”97 For the 3rd Battalion, 7th 
Marines who deployed to Sangin district in the Fall of 2010, the moniker quickly became 
evident. Progress in Sangin came with a steep price.  
 In July 2010, 3/7 arrived in Sangin to assist the 40th British Commando Battalion. 
In the time they had spent in the district, the British forces had made little progress in 
Sangin. Improvised explosive devices littered the streets, making patrols costly ventures. 
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Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Clay Tipton, the 3/7’s mission, dubbed “Operation 
Sangin Sunrise” was to secure the area surrounding Sangin. The thinking behind this 
strategy was to secure the district of Sangin and allow the commandos to continue COIN 
efforts without fear of Taliban reinforcement. Though these moves were kinetic in nature, 
clearing areas of insurgent activity is an essential component of COIN. For security to be 
maintained and relationships established between counterinsurgents and civilians, 
insurgents must have limited contact with civilian populations. According to 3-33, this 
separation is created by eliminating insurgent presence and replacing it with pro-
government forces. The manual also states that the most effective way to accomplish this 
goal is by cordoning off areas of high enemy activity.98Once a perimeter was established 
around the district, Tipton focused his efforts on the “green zones” which surrounded the 
Helmand River. A major contributor to the slow movement in the Sangin was the threat 
of IEDs. The Marines dealt with this threat by deploying Assault Breacher Vehicles 
(ABVs) into the zone to clear it. ABVs are mine clearing vehicles; tanks equipped with 
large forks and Demolition Line Charges which can be shot outward to destroy strings of 
IEDs. 99 According to the battalion’s command chronology, Kilo Company was primarily 
responsible for this action. Pushing from a forward operating base outside the green zone 
and working their way in, the battalion cleared a path into the zone and established four 
new patrol bases. Once the company established themselves along the Helmand River, 
they then began conducting COIN operations. Following the clearing of IEDs, Kilo 
Company began operations to disrupt insurgent activity. For more than a month, the 
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Marines in the green zone conducted security patrols, ambushes, and engaged local 
leaders while Weapons Company provided mortar support for Kilo and worked to reduce 
the number of IEDs in the routes in the eastern section of the district.100  
 Successful counterinsurgency depends on the establishment of a permanent 
presence amongst local populations. However, an occupation force cannot hope to divert 
civilian attention from an insurgency when the insurgency effectively denies them 
freedom of movement within a battle space. The arrival of Tipton’s Marines gave the 
ISAF a chance to turn the tide in Sangin. To loosen the Taliban’s chokehold, the Marine 
battalion began pushing into areas such as the green zone. A major concern for the British 
in Sangin had been IEDs. Britain’s presence in post- 9/11 wars, while important to the 
progress made by coalition forces in Iraq and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, was dwarfed 
by that of the United States. The simple reality of low troop numbers made it difficult to 
establish a permanent presence for civilian engagement. For the beleaguered British 
forces in Sangin, the Taliban fighters in the district presented a seemingly insurmountable 
restriction to their movement. Insurgents in Sangin, seemingly unshaken by the British 
presence in Sangin, often placed explosives just outside British bases. This both restricted 
the ability of British soldiers to conduct patrols and establish relationships with Afghan 
civilians.101 Marine units helped remove pressure from units inside the towns and 
villages. Another element of this strategy involved sending a company across the 
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Helmand River to stymy Taliban reinforcements moving from neighboring Musa Qala 
District.  
 Captain Patrick McKinley, commanding officer of India Company during 3/7’s 
Sangin deployment, led the push across the Helmand River. Counterinsurgency efforts 
within the district, largely under the direction of the British, required freedom of 
movement within Sangin’s towns. Musa Qala district, according to Marine records and 
testimonial, held supply routes from which Taliban fighters and logistics (including 
IEDs) entered Sangin. McKinley and his men established fighting positions along the 
river, opposite from the remainder of the battalion. For nearly two months, the company 
maintained fighting positions near the town of Doab. Unlike a typical Marine experience 
of living within the walls of a FOB or Patrol Base (PB), India Company occupied 
fighting positions that were little more than foxholes.102 Taliban resistance in Musa Qala 
was staunch. Attacks coming from Doab were aggressive, often making it difficult for 
McKinley to organize relief for various platoons along the river. One attempt at relieving 
a platoon near Doab brought the civilian reality into the picture. A convoy of armored 
vehicles traveled through the city unaware of the combatant status of the townspeople. 
According to McKinley “we are kind of in a hostile country and not sure if it was full on 
Taliban within the Town of Doab or just the Pashtun culture itself, we’re the outsiders, 
they don’t want us there.  From the locals, they had not seen coalition forces in about 
three years, so we were definitely new to that area.”103 Such was the reason for India’s 
presence on the opposite side of the river. If Taliban fighters continued to pour in from 
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other districts, the crucial work within Sangin itself could not begin. The civilians in the 
town of Doab represented the reality the Marines sought to change.  
 The 2010 deployment of 3/7 was primarily focused on making Sangin district a 
place where counterinsurgency operations could be conducted. British forces in control of 
the district, while controlling nearly thirty FOBs and PBs, were focused on the 
establishment of those areas and seemingly unable to get out and interact with the people 
of Sangin. Unfortunately, the 40th Commandos transferred out of Sangin in September 
2010, making the 3/7 the sole battalion in until its replacement by the 3/5 in October. Due 
to the reduction in force, the number of ISAF strongpoints in the district was reduced to 
ten. With the departure of the British battalion, the Marine Corps now held operational 
command of the district.104 Despite the departure of the commandos, the Marines had 
initiated a change in direction for Sangin. Whereas prior to 2010 the Taliban had to 
contend only with the British in Sangin, the arrival of American reinforcements changed 
that. Furthermore, the simple act of pushing into the surrounding area and into untouched 
areas within Sangin itself, was a step toward establishing the necessary environment for 
COIN operations to begin in earnest. Though the summer of 2010 did not deliver Sangin 
from the clutches of the Taliban, the Marines displayed notable initiative and effectively 
initiated the long process of counterinsurgency. 
 Experts responsible for 3-33.5 placed significant reliance on an ever-present 
occupation force. American forces conducting COIN operations were expected to be on 
the offensive, defensive, and providing stability all at once. As doctrine dictated, the 
Marines were not to distinguish offensive from defensive tactics; “A Marine force 
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assigned an area security mission during a COIN operation executes it as a combat 
operation. The force establishes and maintains measures to protect people and 
infrastructure from hostile acts or influences while actively seeking out and engaging 
insurgent forces.”105 In order to ensure peaceful relations and security in hostile areas, 
counterinsurgent forces must conduct regular patrols in civilian areas. FOBs provided 
security for the occupation force and a base of logistics; however, trust could not be 
earned by remaining behind walls.  
 When the 3/5 Marines arrived in Sangin arrived in October 2010. They quickly 
began to patrol the villages and fields that dotted Sangin. Unfortunately for them, Sangin 
remained the deadliest corner of the country. Marine veteran and renowned author Bing 
West accompanied a platoon of 3/5 Marines throughout their stint in Sangin. In the six 
months 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, spent in Sangin, they conducted more than 400 
patrols and were engaged 171 times. By the conclusion of only its second day in Sangin 
district, the battalion suffered eight dead and dozens wounded; many of them due to 
roadside bombs. These casualties became a typical occurrence when Marines left the 
security of their FOBs.106 Nicholas Anderson, who served with the 3/5 in 2010, dealt with 
these realities daily. His platoon moved through the district slowly, using metal detectors 
to pick up explosives along their path. Though their training taught them to refrain from 
marching in a single column, the threat of IEDs forced them to march in a line. Moving 
through Sangin, despite the presence of EOD specialists, was arduous, Anderson recalled 
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“We only moved 50 feet one day. It took us two hours, it was very slow.”107 By putting 
themselves at almost constant risk, the Marines of 3/5 strove to improve the security of 
the district. 
 Keeping with the policies laid out in 3-33.5, the Marines of 3/5 made regular 
excursions beyond the confines of their FOBs and outposts. Though they strove to kill 
Taliban insurgents and clear IEDs, they had a second duty to the civilians of Sangin. 
Since insurgents often operated close to civilian areas, Marines regularly took fire from 
homes and village compounds. Due to the fragile nature of trust-building and necessity of 
confirming targets before engaging them, Marines were instructed to hold fire unless 
positive identification could be made.108 In Nick Anderson’s experience, the local 
civilians had little trust for the Americans and recalled instances in which the Taliban 
used children (apparently with the permission of parents) to discourage return fire from 
the Marines. His interpreters told him and his comrades that the villagers were fearful of 
the Marines because Taliban fighters spread information through communities. The 
civilians in Anderson’s area of operation believed that Marines were in Sangin to kill 
civilians and cut off their heads.109 As 3/5 continued its deadly deployment, it became 
increasingly clear that a constant presence was, in fact, one of the few ways to quell 
civilian fears.  
 Counterinsurgents, according to Manual 3-33.5, must be prepared to address 
civilian needs from the start of operations. Doing so allows them to reshape the 
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environment and make it difficult for the insurgents to maintain public sympathy. 
Addressing needs is essential to building rapport with civilians. For units in zones of high 
insurgent activity, this task must be performed under fire.110 The Marines of 3/5 
experienced combat regularly; however, civil affairs efforts had begun despite heavy 
Taliban activity. In January, civil affairs officers in the 3/5 began examinations of a flood 
defense wall that failed to prevent annual floods in the district.111 Other projects included 
the construction of new roads and schools. Unfortunately for the Marines of 3/5, these 
projects were heavily opposed by pockets of Taliban who attacked civil affairs 
officers.112 Civil affairs operations rarely continued unopposed in Helmand; the 
willingness of the 3/5 to begin public works in the early months of American 
involvement in Sangin, illustrated its commitment to improving the district. 
 Though civil affairs efforts were taking root, patrols defined the experience of 
many Marines in the 3/5. Every day, patrols were sent through the district in pursuit of 
increased security. While the perils of regular patrols remained, their impact was tangible 
by the spring months of 2011. Marines on patrol began to encounter more civilians than 
they had upon arrival in October. Families were seen on streets that had been practically 
abandoned in 2010. Marines interviewed by journalists spoke of this profound shift, made 
even more significant by the level of violence that continued to define the district.113 Nick 
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Anderson noticed a similar change as his deployment continued into 2011. It was 
common to encounter families while on patrol. He felt that the presence of Marines 
heavily influenced this shift, “they probably felt safe because there were Marines 
everywhere with guns. If someone pops up, that guys not going to live long enough to kill 
more than a couple of people.”114 Anderson’s testimony addresses an intriguing aspect of 
Sangin in 2011. Though he does not imply complete pacification in areas of increased 
civilian traffic, he indicates that the concept of security by constant presence held a 
degree of validity. In six months, the 3/5 Marines suffered 25 deaths, with 184 wounded 
(including 34 who lost limbs to IEDs).115 By conducting regular patrols, and in turn 
putting themselves at high risk, the Marines had seemingly adopted the security principal 
of 3-33.5. The casualties taken and contact made with the Taliban, in some form, had 
convinced civilians in Sangin that the 3/5 was not a malicious force.  
 In the summer of 2011, elements of the 1st Battalion 6th Marines deployed to 
Sangin to assist the 1st Battalion 5th Marines, which had assumed command from the 3/5. 
Staff sergeant Nicholas Archut served as a platoon leader for Alpha Company during its 
time in Sangin district. Though some of the Marines in 3/5 noticed an increased civilian 
presence in the areas they patrolled, the Taliban remained active in the district. Archut 
and his platoon conducted regular patrols that frequently encountered insurgents (Archut 
claims that the platoon was engaged every day during the first month) and took casualties 
from IEDs. In addition to the patrols, Archut took part in shuras with local leaders. 
Shuras allowed Marines and civilian authorities to come together and discuss military 
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operations and civilian needs. At some point during the deployment, the platoon 
established positions near PB Georgia, an area of significant Taliban activity. There, 
Archut led a shura, where he explained the best ways for civilians to avoid harm and they 
in turn told him about improvements their village required. While Archut spoke with the 
local leaders, a squad posted outside of the village fell under attack by Taliban lying in 
the surrounding cornfields. Taliban leaders resented the idea of Americans meeting with 
Afghan civilians and frequently attempted to disrupt such meetings. The ability of the 
Marines effectively to prevent Taliban interference of shuras likely led to increased trust 
between the Marines and civilians. In fact, as time passed, civilians began sharing 
information on the Taliban in Archut’s area. According to them, the local Taliban leader 
returned from Pakistan with an additional twenty fighters just prior to the arrival of 
1/6.116 Despite almost constant harassment from the Taliban, Archut and his platoon 
maintained a constant presence and worked to establish contact with the civilians in his 
area of operations. 
 Sergeant Bjorn Cantrell arrived in Sangin in July of 2011. Once he and his squad 
arrived in the district, they began conducting patrols. The area to the north of Cantrell’s 
base of operations was relatively quiet, with much of the Taliban activity occurring in the 
south. When he began patrolling with his squad, he noticed that civilians tended to run 
away from the Marines rather than interact with them. Cantrell believed that they ran off 
in the direction of the Taliban. The Taliban, knowing that fleeing civilians meant Marine 
patrols, set up IEDs in Marines’ path. Judging by the aggressiveness of the insurgents to 
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the south, Cantrell believed that the area was a stronghold or proving ground for the 
Taliban117 Cantrell and his squad also noticed a difference in the way civilians from these 
areas interacted with them:  
The people on our map to the north, they were all extremely friendly. If you saw 
people working in the fields, you could go up to them. You could talk to them and 
they would talk to you… To the south, there was no relationship at all. As soon as 
they saw us coming, the instantly headed south to avoid us. We were never able to 
build a rapport with them. The only time we ever went down there, we either 
found an IED, hit an IED, or got in an ambush. [The people they did talk to would 
typically say] ‘the Taliban don’t want us talking to you, they are going to cut off 
my head tonight if I talk to you for too long. I’m going to leave, have a good 
day.118 
Cantrell’s time in Sangin lasted little more than two months. In that time, he noticed that 
the civilians in his area seemed largely indifferent to both the Marines and the Taliban. In 
his mind, they were accustomed to the fighting and just waited for it to end, regardless of 
outcome.119 Though Cantrell’s experience in Sangin was fraught with hardship, it was 
representative of the inherent difficulty in maintaining pressure in counterinsurgency. 
The simple act of making themselves available for civilian interaction was crucial to any 
future success in the counterinsurgency process. Civilians in southern Sangin were likely 
hesitant because they knew the Taliban would linger. At this point, they could not say the 
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same thing about the Marines, who had only just arrived. Interactions between Sangin 
civilians and Battalion 1/6 represented the steep cost of building trust. 
 In the latter half of 2011, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was replaced by the 3rd 
Battalion 7th Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Seth Folsom. In August, 
Folsom visited Sangin to gather information from Battalion 1/5’s commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Tom Savage. Savage introduced Folsom to the district, its dangers, and the 
people he would interact with in shuras. A few weeks later, Folsom returned with his 
battalion to conduct the Relief in Place (RIP) with Savage’s battalion. To avoid 
unnecessary casualties, Folsom instructed his company commanders to ask questions and 
withhold criticism while the 1/5 transferred its knowledge of the battlespace. Ignoring 
advice from a unit that knew the territory was unwise if one hoped to make progress.120 
Unit rotations held a potential challenge to counterinsurgency. Building relationships 
with civilians required Marines to make regular appearance at shuras and other civilian 
gatherings. Through interaction with outgoing units, incoming Marines such as those in 
3/7 educated themselves on their new battlespace and how best to interact with locals. 
However, the onus was on incoming commanders, like Folsom, to ensure that new units 
made the transition as harmless as possible for civilians living in the area.  
From September to April, the 3/7 maintained the operational cadence that began 
in 2010 with the arrival of 3/5. However, civilians seemed to interact much more with the 
Marines in this period than they had in the past. Lance Corporal Thomas Bailey, in a unit-
produced film, described his interactions with local civilians, “The youth are always 
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running up screaming for chocolate, you’ve got the elders coming up and they’re saying 
hello. Across the board, they’re actually pretty welcoming.” 121 Lt. Col. Folsom also dealt 
with children on a regular basis. Though he liked to see children approaching them, he 
was disheartened by older children who bullied the younger ones when they received 
candy. Folsom hoped that small acts such as handing out candy would help win the 
population over to their side, yet he acknowledged the presence of vindictive individuals. 
Small precautions were taken by Folsom to avoid disputes. He refused to give candy to 
older children and would not give it to the young when they were around.122 While 
Folsom’s policy of doling out candy may seem insignificant at face value; its 
implications speak to the complexity of COIN strategy. A small child would pose little 
threat to Marines; the same cannot be said of an older child or young adult whose future 
was certainly up in the air. A young man angered by the conduct of Marines (however 
insignificant the insult), would certainly find a place in the insurgency.  
 While the Marines worked to maintain relations with civilians by allocating goods 
and services, the means by which they did so were not always effective. Throughout 2011 
(during the tenure of both 1/5 and 3/7), the Marines in Sangin conducted public works 
projects valued at $900,000. These projects included two roads linking American bases in 
the district and a four-room schoolhouse. Unlike most structures in Sangin, the school 
was constructed with brick. However, Afghan tribal elders refused to provide a teacher 
 
121 Lance Corporal Bobby J. Gonzalez. Dir.“3/7 Sangin II.Mp4- YouTube,” accessed November 
23, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSt0AH7-QGM. 
122 Folsom, Where Youth and Laughter Go, 136. 
 
66 
unless the Americans spent an additional $100,000 on electricity for the building. 123 First 
Lieutenant Matthew Cancian of the 1/5 Marines wrote of these projects in 2013, showing 
a significant disconnect between success and the allocation of funds. While a school is far 
from useless, it was not something the people of Sangin required to increase their 
functionality. Cancian described the reluctance of farmers to grow wheat (likely as 
opposed to poppy) due to a lack of proper equipment. Farmers needed to pay twenty-five 
percent of their profits to utilize the mills of large landowners. The mills were valued at 
$4,550; a proposed project would have allowed the purchase of several mills for public 
use. However, as Cancian put it “The project was stillborn because it was not spectacular 
enough in dollar amount to grab attention.”124 Though the United States was clearly 
willing to expend significant capital on the development of Sangin, a debate between 
glamor and utility complicated the process.  
 Perhaps one of the greatest moral dilemmas within the logistical sphere of 
counterinsurgency, was the importance of the opium trade to Afghanistan’s civilians. In 
2005, an estimated seventy percent of the world’s opium and heroin supply emanated 
from Helmand province, providing $155 million to the Taliban.125 For Lieutenant 
Colonel Folsom, the poppy eradication efforts of the Afghan government, placed him and 
his men in a dangerous predicament. Many farmers in Sangin refused to switch to other 
crops, as the production of poppy was lucrative. Additionally, the Taliban posed a threat 
to farmers refusing to grow it. Unfortunately for Folsom’s men, their duty to support 
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eradication put them at further risk of Taliban aggression. While the eradication of poppy 
served to damage the Taliban’s financial structure, it risked the deterioration of civilian 
trust and the increase of enemy aggression.126 Nicholas Solecki of the 1/7 Marines 
witnessed the Taliban response to poppy eradication in the summer of 2012. His small 
patrol base was surrounded with more than $10 million worth of poppy. In a period of 
relative calm, Afghans charged with the destruction of poppy, arrived on scene with a 
bulldozer. The moment the machine began working, it came under fire from nearby 
Taliban fighters.127 The Marines’ reluctant support of poppy eradication had a seemingly 
insignificant effect on poppy production. A Rand Corporation study completed in 2012 
showed an increase in poppy eradication from 3,810 hectares in 2011 to 9,672 hectares 
destroyed in 2012. Despite this 154% increase in eradication efforts, poppy cultivation in 
Helmand province is shown to have increased from 63,307 to 75,176 hectares. In 2012, a 
total of 3,637 hectares of poppy was eradicated, less than five percent of total cultivation 
in Helmand.128 
 Civilian interactions and economic actions played a significant part in the 
deployments of the Marines in Sangin. The daily interactions with children were one-way 
Americans strove to build a foundation upon which to launch civic actions. Marines such 
as Lt. Col. Folsom made efforts to understand the possible implications of their actions. 
Unfortunately, these grassroots efforts were not always complimented by successful 
economic support. Building new schools certainly provided long term benefits; however, 
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the immediate needs of farmers were seemingly sidelined in favor of grandiose spending. 
Counterinsurgency policy makers argue in 3-33.5 that smaller civil affairs projects are 
more likely to succeed. Large projects are conspicuous to insurgents, difficult to 
maintain, and less financially recoverable. Projects geared towards the needs of civilians 
stand the best chance of success.129 The refusal to purchase public mills was likely a 
factor that complicated poppy eradication efforts. Although Taliban resistance to 
eradication was an unchangeable reality, farmers could potentially change crops if 
provided the equipment to do so without sacrificing profit. Failure in this regard likely 
influenced the continuation of significant poppy production in Helmand and increased 
potential for ANA and Marine casualties.  
 Though civil affairs in Sangin was rife with problems, elements of the 
humanitarian side of COIN showed promise. Like in Marjah, Marine Female 
Engagement Teams worked with Afghan women to foster closer connections to Afghan 
families. In Sangin, members of the FET attached to 3/7 went to women’s homes while 
their husbands were working. Speaking with women at their homes allows them to feel 
more comfortable and safe.130 FET in Sangin also extended their mission to include local 
children. In December, FET 8, stationed in FOB Jackson (the main FOB in Sangin, 
located in the southeast), held a children’s shura. More than 50 children traveled to the 
base and listened to a presentation on the dangers of the Taliban, IEDs, and the duties of 
Afghan security forces. The talk was followed by a puppet show which reinforced the 
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safety lessons. Once the shura concluded, the children played soccer with Afghan soldiers 
and American personnel.131 Non-kinetic tasks such as family engagement served a crucial 
objective of counterinsurgency; patrols brought the Marines into the civilian’s world, and 
FETs sought to capitalize on the environment of cooperation. 
 As the Sangin Marines established a permanent presence in the district, advising 
efforts took effect. The period between 2010 and 2014 was one in which the training of 
Afghan soldiers was a top priority. Publication 3-33.5 places great importance on these 
efforts, as the transfer of combat command to native forces is a major end goal of 
counterinsurgency campaigns. American personnel instructing native troops place a large 
focus on individual and group effectiveness. Americans operating in conjunction with 
native forces are made to do so in the smallest ratio possible. Additionally, Americans are 
instructed be respectful of native cultural practices, especially those that are not 
counterproductive to overarching counterinsurgency efforts.132 Though the Marines in 
Sangin worked to build up ANA troops, the situation in 2012 did not bode well for a 
future without an American military presence.   
In the spring of 2012, Marine team leader Nicholas Solecki, following his 
eventful introduction to ANA troops, began the arduous work of advising. Located in a 
small patrol base thirty minutes (by foot) from the nearest FOB, he and twelve other 
Marines lived with twenty-three Afghan soldiers. Apart from marijuana use, Solecki 
noticed a significant lack of enthusiasm among the troops. There were Afghan men in the 
unit who showed talent for soldiering, but they seemed to be a minority. Afghan troops 
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also patrolled alone; when they made contact, the Marines were often ordered to withhold 
support, for their objective was to ensure the ANA could operate on their own.133 Ben 
Anderson, a combat journalist with Vice News, documented similar issues in the fall of 
that year. In addition to the drug use, Anderson saw widespread agitation amongst the 
ANA ranks. Many resented the instruction they received by Marines, claiming that they 
were talked down to. The desire (held by many) for the Marines to leave Sangin was 
compounded with the misconception that all funds given to the Marines by the United 
States government would be given to the ANA once the Marines left.134 
 Such a lack of military professionalism is perhaps best explained by simple 
realities of Afghan life. Many of the recruits added to the Afghan army and security 
forces were disinterested, illiterate men. The needs of the tribe and family often came 
before the needs of Afghanistan. Enlistment in the ANA held the promise of regular pay, 
thus financial security for families. Hatred for the Taliban was in ample supply, but if 
presented the opportunity to earn a living in another fashion, it is likely that many would 
have taken it.135 Many who displayed a willingness to fight the Taliban often disregarded 
the advice given to them by American Marines. In late 2012, Ben Anderson was filming 
a group of Marines and ANA troops under sporadic fire from a nearby cluster of 
buildings. Safe behind the walls of their FOB and unable to positively identify the enemy, 
the Marines advised the men to hold position. This advice was ignored by an ANA 
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officer who grabbed a light machine gun and walked out of the base, firing in the 
direction of the Taliban. This incident resulted in little more than the unnecessary 
expenditure of ammunition.136  Solecki’s own experience working with the ANA made 
both him and his comrades wary of the amount of responsibility they placed in the hands 
of their Afghan Allies. Though the purpose of the combined platoon was to allow the 
ANA to walk point and lead, this was not always possible, especially in areas known for 
Taliban activity. While a Marine working towards handing control to the ANA would be 
wise to train his ally, the laws of self-preservation sometimes overrode these objectives. 
Solecki and his men often maintained control out of fear that the ANA would lead them 
into a deadly situation.137  
 Incidents such as those documented by Anderson and Solecki were a major 
hindrance on advising efforts. Impending withdrawal likely provided little assurance that 
operational efficiency was achievable. To complicate the Marines’ advising task further, 
the frequent infiltration of the ANA by the Taliban and internal (Marine-ANA) disputes, 
threatened security within bases. These green-on-blue incidents occurred when Afghan 
security forces attacked ISAF personnel training them.138 In 2012 these attacks reached 
new heights and accounted for 15 percent of all coalition deaths in Afghanistan. Many 
commanders claimed that most attacks were the result of cultural differences, while 
Afghan officials blamed enemy infiltration. Between 2008 and 2017, nineteen green-on-
blue attacks were reported in Helmand province, for a total of thirty-four killed and 
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thirty-two wounded. Attacks were most common in 2012, with sixty-one total dead in 
Afghanistan, and eighty-one wounded.139 In his 2012 Eid al Fitr address, Mohammed 
Omar, the original leader of the Taliban, addressed the green-on-blue attacks. He called 
upon Afghan men to abandon their posts and join the Taliban: 
Mujahideen have cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy…Thanks to the 
infiltration of the Mujahideen, they are able to enter bases, offices and intelligence 
centers of the enemy. Then, they easily carry out decisive and coordinated attacks, 
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy both in life and equipment… I invite all 
personnel of the Kabul Administration, particularly, the personnel of police and 
army, their officers and the employees of the intelligence department to abandon 
support of the invaders against your religion and country; join the ranks of 
Mujahideen like your heroic colleagues–those who deal crushing blows at the 
invaders from time to time.140 
The threat of infiltration was an ever-present factor in the lives of Sangin Marines. 
Threats to their well-being, while an inherent challenge of counterinsurgency operations, 
meant that marines took on extreme risk in the mission to train their Afghan allies. 
 In the spring of 2014, the last Marines departed Sangin, leaving the 2nd Brigade, 
215th Corps of the ANA in charge of the district. Some Marines interviewed in the final 
days of the drawdown displayed a high level of confidence in the ability of the brigade to 
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maintain security on their own.141 However, regardless of one brigade’s ability to fight, 
the difficulties in the previous few years suggested that the ANA required much 
additional preparation before it was ready to stand against or defeat the Taliban. Brigadier 
General Daniel D. Yoo believed that a permanent solution to the Taliban would likely 
involve a coexisting of tribes, government, and the Taliban.142 Yoo’s stance seemed to 
reflect a lack of faith in the maintenance of ANA strength in the district. His prediction 
was perhaps too optimistic, for in December 2015, the Taliban seized most of the district 
from the ANA and controlled all but two districts within the wider Helmand province.143  
 The seizing of Sangin by the Taliban in 2015 is certainly sufficient in proving the 
overall failure of American counterinsurgency efforts in the long-term. However, from 
2010 to 2014, the Marines stationed in the district actively worked to enact 
counterinsurgency principles shown in 3-33.5. In 2010, the 3/7 arrived in Sangin, greeted 
by an allied force trapped behind the walls of fortified bases. The work accomplished in 
the opening months of the Marines’ tenure in the district, while costly, began to loosen 
the Taliban’s vice grip on the district. The 3/5 Marines, despite an active Taliban and 
multitude of IEDs scattered across the district, patrolled regularly. Their efforts led to 
increased interaction with civilians whom once feared Marines. Though not every Marine 
shared optimistic views of the future of Sangin, they clearly demonstrated a willingness 
to maintain a physical presence and vigilance in relationship building. The experiences of 
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Marines like Cantrell and Archut were testament to the Marine Corps’ willingness to 
follow the COIN tenant of risk-taking.  
The Marines also attempted to transition these relationships into nation-building 
efforts. Unfortunately for them, protocol surrounding the allocation of funds and the 
eradication of poppy, overshadowed effective logistics support. Advising efforts were a 
major focus for the Marines, but their combat expertise was certainly one of their most 
valuable assets. Although there were men in the Afghan army that were motivated to 
fight, their inexperience, the lack of motivation displayed by many of their comrades and 
the threat of Taliban infiltration complicated these efforts. Unfortunately, an ostensible 
indifference within the ranks of the Afghan Army, coupled with the looming withdrawal, 
prevented the creation of the proper bulwark against Taliban resurgence. In 2019, the 
results of this failure resonate, as the Taliban continues to fight for the soul of 
Afghanistan; against a failing government and a meager force of American advisors. 
Despite Marines’ ability to execute proper counterinsurgency strategy, a permanent, 




CHAPTER V– CONCLUSION 
Shortly following American withdrawal in 2014, Taliban flags began to pop up 
throughout Helmand province. Counterinsurgency efforts performed by so many Marine 
battalions remained unfinished, leaving behind a legacy of failure. Although America’s 
war in Afghanistan failed to bring about the destruction of the Taliban, elements of 
counterinsurgency strategy demand exploration. Counterinsurgency is widely considered 
a total failure in scholarship and media coverage of the war. However, close examination 
of Marine units in Helmand Province between 2010 and 2012 reveal a competency in 
carrying out counterinsurgency operations that reflected official policies of Warfighting 
Publication 3-33.5. The innerworkings of COIN strategy are most apparent in the town of 
Marjah and district of Sangin, where Marines worked alongside Afghan forces to combat 
Taliban dominance, secure civilian populations, and conduct civic action programs. 
Through an examination of Marines on the ground in Helmand, the fine details of 
counterinsurgency shine through; proving the Marine Corps ability to execute military 
policy by the book.  
 Marines operating in Helmand following the troop surge, did so in varying 
environments. However, both Marjah and Sangin demanded the use of kinetic force to 
reduce Taliban activity. Marjah, one of the most significant Taliban strongholds, posed a 
unique challenge in this regard, as civilians often lived close Taliban defenders. 
Counterinsurgency, above all else, demands the fair treatment of civilians. Marine units 
involved in the opening phase of Operation Moshtarak, recognized that 
counterinsurgency began as soon as the operation commenced. Members of the assault 
force, such as the Marines of Battalion 1/6, relied less on artillery and air support, and 
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more on shoulder fired rockets and underslung grenade launchers. Precautionary 
measures failed to fully prevent collateral damage, but the reluctance to take full 
advantage of American firepower likely limited civilian casualties. Once major combat 
operations ceased, Marines and their Afghan allies established checkpoints and patrols 
that served to separate civilians from insurgents. Kinetic operations in Sangin served a 
similar purpose. While limiting civilian casualties was certainly important, the primary 
threat to COIN in Sangin was the flow of insurgents into the district from surrounding 
areas. Blocking positions established by Battalion 3/7 in the first half of 2010 helped to 
limit the Taliban’s freedom of movement in the district. Although operations in both 
locations began kinetically, the Marines were, in fact, performing the crucial COIN phase 
of “clear”.144 
 Once the Taliban no longer operated unopposed, Marines and their Afghan allies 
maintained their presence amongst the civilian population. In Sangin, Marines conducted 
daily patrols throughout the district. The constant patrols sought to eliminate IED scatted 
throughout Sangin, engage bands of insurgents, and to show civilians that the Marines 
were there to separate them from the Taliban. In time, locals increased their interactions 
with Marines. In Marjah, similar patrols were conducted. Additionally, checkpoints were 
established throughout the town to restrict the movement of insurgents seeking reentry. 
Maintaining a presence was perhaps the most fundamental element of counterinsurgency 
 
144 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Section 5-57, 176. The idea of “clear” in the case of Marjah 
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in Helmand. In both Marjah and Sangin, the combined units of Marines and Afghan 
forces put themselves at additional risk in the spirit of security and relationship building.  
 Marines providing security also acted as advisors to the Afghan army and police 
forces. Military experts behind 3-33.5 recognized the importance of host nation forces to 
defeating an insurgency. The purpose of the American troop surge was to not only reduce 
Taliban holdings in Afghanistan, but also enable the Afghanistan military to operate 
effectively without American assistance. Marine forces in both Marjah and Sangin 
patrolled and fought alongside the ANA and ANCOP. Unfortunately, these partnerships 
were not always productive, as poor leadership, marijuana use, and seemingly carefree 
attitudes toward the security situation, were common. Furthermore, instances of Taliban 
infiltration meant that Marines needed to be mindful of green-on-blue attacks. Operating 
alongside Afghan units arguably presented the Marines with their greatest challenge and 
threat. Careless soldiers threatened the security of their comrades and the Marines, whom 
already bore additional risk by placing themselves in contested areas during patrols. Still, 
Marines consistently pushed their allies to perform their duties with purpose and 
precision. Throughout the process, Marines occasionally encountered effective officers 
whose leadership created productive learning environments. Unfortunately, American 
forces could not create operational zeal where none existed, thus military success in the 
post-American years remained dubious. Regardless of the potential (or lack thereof) of 
the Afghan military, it does little to diminish the commitment the Marines displayed to 
the advising side of COIN.   
 Marines in Helmand certainly performed their share of kinetic operations. The 
security provided through assaults and patrols (all essential components in 3-33.5) 
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allowed Marine and civilian counterinsurgent elements to perform their duties. In both 
Marjah and Sangin, Marines met regularly with local leaders in shuras. Other actions, like 
doling out candy to children, or the deployment of Female Engagement Teams, allowed 
Marines to interact with less enfranchised members of society; giving them a chance to 
create a positive image in all Afghans. Marines interacted with civilians both improve 
relations and gather information on necessary civil affairs projects. Such projects 
included the improvement of water retention walls, schools, wells, and medical facilities. 
Additionally, the presence of the Marines allowed civilian members of District 
Stabilization Teams to consult Afghans on a variety of issues, such as sanitation. Marine 
units augmented the capabilities of civilian counterinsurgents, many of whom lacked 
resources necessary to perform their duties on the scale required.  
 Upon American withdrawal in 2014, Afghanistan remained the world’s leading 
producer of poppy. Helmand is Afghanistan’s most poppy-rich province, which made its 
cultivation a primary concern for the American counterinsurgency effort. By 2017, poppy 
production in Helmand had increased by 79 percent, indicating clear failure to transition 
Afghanistan agriculture to less illicit crops.145 In Helmand, eradication progressed slowly. 
Prior to February 2010, Marjah was a Taliban stronghold largely centered on the 
production and exportation of poppy. American decision makers offered payment to 
farmers willing to switch to less illicit crops; however, few were willing to adopt new 
crops that earned them far less than the cultivation of poppy. Other than the maintenance 
of checkpoints (which were not solely geared toward drug interdiction) American forces 
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did not strictly inhibit production. The experiences of Marines such as Nicholaus Solecki 
suggested severe Taliban resistance to the destruction of poppy fields. Though 
eradication efforts seemingly lacked purpose, the fact that Marines did not aggressively 
push for eradication represented a level of respect for civilian farmers. Poppy produced in 
Helmand was largely sold illegally; however, making eradication optional was likely less 
damaging to the environment of cooperation the Marines hoped to cultivate. 
 Counterinsurgency operations in Marjah and Sangin during the post-surge 
months proceeded with stringent time constraints. When President Obama agreed to the 
troop surge, the mission was given a timetable; gradual withdrawal was set to begin in 
July 2011. By 2015, less than 10,000 troops remained in Afghanistan; a sharp decrease 
from the nearly 140,000 deployed in 2010.146 An essential component to the success of 
counterinsurgency is the investment of time. American leaders tasked with conducting 
the counterinsurgency campaign of the post-surge era counted on the quick expulsion of 
the Taliban followed by rapid nation building. However, counterinsurgency experts 
contend that successful COIN requires proper time for relationships to bloom between 
counterinsurgents and host nation actors. While a surge in troop strength was a step in the 
right direction, the looming draw-down doomed post-surge counterinsurgency to failure. 
Discussions of counterinsurgency failure in Afghanistan, which began mere months 
following the launch of major operations in Helmand, indicate a profound ignorance of 
the commitment necessary to incite change. Failure in Afghanistan was likely due to the 
unwillingness to commit surge-level troop strength for a prolonged period, rather than 
 
146 Jackson, “American Strategy in Afghanistan,” 98-105. 
 
80 
operational ineptitude on part of the Marine Corps. As operations in Marjah and Sangin 
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